By: Ben Smith (Politico)
Mark Penn's exit from his role as Hillary Rodham Clinton's chief strategist likely will portend no dramatic shift in message for the campaign in coming weeks but will bring satisfaction to scores of Clinton loyalists who have wanted the controversial image-meister sacked for months. Penn's decision to step down Sunday came after a contretemps about his work for a foreign government triggered the latest in a series of public distractions from her presidential campaign. Clinton's campaign manager Maggie Williams appeared to tie Penn's departure to his meeting with the Colombian government, a client of the public relations firm he leads, about their campaign for a free trade agreement Clinton opposes. But for Clinton's aides and advisors, the meeting was just the latest in a list of complaints about Penn that began with his strategic decision last year to focus on a message of strength and electability rather than inspiration, and his insistence on highlighting policy over passion. His $13 million in campaign billing and his insistence on maintaining his salary as worldwide CEO of the firm Burson Marsteller were also sources of tension within the campaign. "After the events of the last few days, Mark Penn has asked to give up his role as Chief Strategist of the Clinton Campaign; Mark, and Penn, Schoen and Berland Associates, Inc. will continue to provide polling and advice to the campaign," said Williams in a statement to reporters early Sunday evening. Williams said Clinton's communications director, Howard Wolfson, and a pollster who recently joined the campaign, Geoff Garin, "will coordinate the campaign's strategic message team going forward." Few in Clinton's circle foresee a dramatic shift in direction, largely because it is now too late for a dramatic shift in message – voters in the largest remaining state, Pennsylvania, cast their ballots in two weeks. "This was really a function of Colombia, not a referendum on his strategic vision," insisted one senior campaign aide. If there's any immediate consequence, though, it will be to morale inside a shell-shocked campaign where Penn's compensation, his attention to his business, and his gruff demeanor made him a divisive figure. "It was very demoralizing for the staff that's working 24/7 to see him doing book tours and engaging in private sector activities," said a prominent Clinton supporter. "It was an important statement for the campaign to make to its own team."
Penn was the source of a long series of campaign flare-ups. One subsidiary of Burson Marsteller represented the controversial private security firm Blackwater. Another angered unions Clinton was courting by working for companies trying to defeat union organizing campaigns. His firm also collected more than $11 million from Clinton's campaign through the end of February, and was owed $2.5 million more in the most recent filing, though part of that sum is polling expenses. In recent weeks, Penn created additional controversy by suggesting New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson's endorsement – which Clinton had assiduously sought – was meaningless and by his matter-of-fact assertion to reporters that Obama simply can't beat the presumptive Republican nominee, Arizona Senator John McCain. Penn, one of the most influential political advisors of his generation, nevertheless accomplished a great deal as the campaign's top strategist. Clinton began the campaign with obvious vulnerabilities: A high percentage of Americans disliking her; the ambiguous experience of a White House spouse; and little natural charisma. With his trademark barrage of poll numbers, Penn – who had worked with Bill Clinton since the former president's 1996 re-election campaign — managed to persuade journalists and Democratic voters that the New York senator could actually win a general election.
And his focus on her strength – along with her own tough debate performances – erased any lingering doubts about whether a woman would be tough enough to serve as commander-in-chief. That accomplishment revealed Penn at his best--a cocksure advisor to some of the world's most important figures in politics and commerce, with clients ranging from Microsoft's Bill Gates to U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair. But even as Clinton proved an able candidate, Illinois Senator Barack Obama's soaring rhetoric connected with voters and generated tremendous grass roots enthusiasm, providing a stark contrast between the two. Since Clinton's 2000 campaign for Senate, Penn had argued for a focus on policy over emotion. "Being human is overrated," Penn reportedly joked at a debate prep session last winter, and the remark was, to his critics, his central failing. Indeed, Penn spent part of 2007 marketing his new book, "Microtrends," which stressed the power of tiny demographic groups, rather than broad messages. The book begins by invoking an old Volkswagon slogan, "Think Small." "It was a revolutionary idea – a call for the shrinking of perspective, ambition, and scale," Penn wrote. But as Clinton thought small and targeted narrow groups – adults who care for their parents, for instance – with specific messages, Obama's broader themes often carried the day. And when it came to organizing on the ground in Iowa and elsewhere, it was Obama who proved more able to focus on the small things. Penn predicted victory for Clinton in Iowa, and was ridiculed for it to the extent that Bill Clinton rose to his defense in response to a hostile question a few days later in New Hampshire. "You can take a shot at Mark Penn if you want. It wasn't his best day. He was hurt, he felt badly that we didn't do better in Iowa," he said. Penn's internal rivals, including advisor Harold Ickes, never let him forget his Iowa error. "I'm not going to make any predictions. I'll leave that up to Mark," Ickes said on a March conference call with reporters. And the core of Penn's strategy appeared to go out the window after Clinton seemed to turn around the polls in New Hampshire by almost crying in a conversation with a woman at a diner. Until this weekend, however, Penn remained a central figure in the Clinton campaign. He led strategy calls, headed Clinton's team in post-debate "spin rooms," and was a rumpled, occasionally aggrieved figure on television until a new campaign manager, Williams, forbade him to make any further appearances. The end of Penn's tenure as chief strategist offered immediate satisfaction to his many internal detractors, but the campaign signaled no change from its latest strategic direction, which Penn helped shape: an argument that only Clinton has a good chance of beating the Republican nominee.
© 2007 Capitol News Company, LLC
Mark Penn's exit from his role as Hillary Rodham Clinton's chief strategist likely will portend no dramatic shift in message for the campaign in coming weeks but will bring satisfaction to scores of Clinton loyalists who have wanted the controversial image-meister sacked for months. Penn's decision to step down Sunday came after a contretemps about his work for a foreign government triggered the latest in a series of public distractions from her presidential campaign. Clinton's campaign manager Maggie Williams appeared to tie Penn's departure to his meeting with the Colombian government, a client of the public relations firm he leads, about their campaign for a free trade agreement Clinton opposes. But for Clinton's aides and advisors, the meeting was just the latest in a list of complaints about Penn that began with his strategic decision last year to focus on a message of strength and electability rather than inspiration, and his insistence on highlighting policy over passion. His $13 million in campaign billing and his insistence on maintaining his salary as worldwide CEO of the firm Burson Marsteller were also sources of tension within the campaign. "After the events of the last few days, Mark Penn has asked to give up his role as Chief Strategist of the Clinton Campaign; Mark, and Penn, Schoen and Berland Associates, Inc. will continue to provide polling and advice to the campaign," said Williams in a statement to reporters early Sunday evening. Williams said Clinton's communications director, Howard Wolfson, and a pollster who recently joined the campaign, Geoff Garin, "will coordinate the campaign's strategic message team going forward." Few in Clinton's circle foresee a dramatic shift in direction, largely because it is now too late for a dramatic shift in message – voters in the largest remaining state, Pennsylvania, cast their ballots in two weeks. "This was really a function of Colombia, not a referendum on his strategic vision," insisted one senior campaign aide. If there's any immediate consequence, though, it will be to morale inside a shell-shocked campaign where Penn's compensation, his attention to his business, and his gruff demeanor made him a divisive figure. "It was very demoralizing for the staff that's working 24/7 to see him doing book tours and engaging in private sector activities," said a prominent Clinton supporter. "It was an important statement for the campaign to make to its own team."
Penn was the source of a long series of campaign flare-ups. One subsidiary of Burson Marsteller represented the controversial private security firm Blackwater. Another angered unions Clinton was courting by working for companies trying to defeat union organizing campaigns. His firm also collected more than $11 million from Clinton's campaign through the end of February, and was owed $2.5 million more in the most recent filing, though part of that sum is polling expenses. In recent weeks, Penn created additional controversy by suggesting New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson's endorsement – which Clinton had assiduously sought – was meaningless and by his matter-of-fact assertion to reporters that Obama simply can't beat the presumptive Republican nominee, Arizona Senator John McCain. Penn, one of the most influential political advisors of his generation, nevertheless accomplished a great deal as the campaign's top strategist. Clinton began the campaign with obvious vulnerabilities: A high percentage of Americans disliking her; the ambiguous experience of a White House spouse; and little natural charisma. With his trademark barrage of poll numbers, Penn – who had worked with Bill Clinton since the former president's 1996 re-election campaign — managed to persuade journalists and Democratic voters that the New York senator could actually win a general election.
And his focus on her strength – along with her own tough debate performances – erased any lingering doubts about whether a woman would be tough enough to serve as commander-in-chief. That accomplishment revealed Penn at his best--a cocksure advisor to some of the world's most important figures in politics and commerce, with clients ranging from Microsoft's Bill Gates to U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair. But even as Clinton proved an able candidate, Illinois Senator Barack Obama's soaring rhetoric connected with voters and generated tremendous grass roots enthusiasm, providing a stark contrast between the two. Since Clinton's 2000 campaign for Senate, Penn had argued for a focus on policy over emotion. "Being human is overrated," Penn reportedly joked at a debate prep session last winter, and the remark was, to his critics, his central failing. Indeed, Penn spent part of 2007 marketing his new book, "Microtrends," which stressed the power of tiny demographic groups, rather than broad messages. The book begins by invoking an old Volkswagon slogan, "Think Small." "It was a revolutionary idea – a call for the shrinking of perspective, ambition, and scale," Penn wrote. But as Clinton thought small and targeted narrow groups – adults who care for their parents, for instance – with specific messages, Obama's broader themes often carried the day. And when it came to organizing on the ground in Iowa and elsewhere, it was Obama who proved more able to focus on the small things. Penn predicted victory for Clinton in Iowa, and was ridiculed for it to the extent that Bill Clinton rose to his defense in response to a hostile question a few days later in New Hampshire. "You can take a shot at Mark Penn if you want. It wasn't his best day. He was hurt, he felt badly that we didn't do better in Iowa," he said. Penn's internal rivals, including advisor Harold Ickes, never let him forget his Iowa error. "I'm not going to make any predictions. I'll leave that up to Mark," Ickes said on a March conference call with reporters. And the core of Penn's strategy appeared to go out the window after Clinton seemed to turn around the polls in New Hampshire by almost crying in a conversation with a woman at a diner. Until this weekend, however, Penn remained a central figure in the Clinton campaign. He led strategy calls, headed Clinton's team in post-debate "spin rooms," and was a rumpled, occasionally aggrieved figure on television until a new campaign manager, Williams, forbade him to make any further appearances. The end of Penn's tenure as chief strategist offered immediate satisfaction to his many internal detractors, but the campaign signaled no change from its latest strategic direction, which Penn helped shape: an argument that only Clinton has a good chance of beating the Republican nominee.
© 2007 Capitol News Company, LLC
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