Monday, February 28, 2022

The Crisis That Nearly Cost Charles Dickens His Career

The Crisis That Nearly Cost Charles Dickens His Career


The most beloved writer of his age, he had an unfailing sense of what the public wanted—almost.

By Louis Menand The New Yorker


A captivating entertainer, Dickens sought to make life as enchanting as a show. Illustration by Wesley Allsbrook

Charles Dickens took cold showers and long walks. His normal walking distance was twelve miles; some days, he walked twenty. He seems to have never not been doing something. He wrote fifteen novels and hundreds of articles and stories, delivered speeches, edited magazines, produced and acted in amateur theatricals, performed conjuring tricks, gave public readings, and directed two charities, one for struggling writers, the other for former prostitutes.

He and his wife, Catherine, had ten children and many friends, most of them writers, actors, and artists, whom it delighted Dickens to entertain and travel with. He gave money to relatives (including his financially feckless parents), orphans, and people down on their luck. Thomas Adolphus Trollope called him “perhaps the largest-hearted man I ever knew.” He was a literary celebrity by the time he turned twenty-five, and he never lost his readership. Working people read his books, and so did the Queen. People took off their hats when they saw him on the street.

He was by far the most commercially successful of the major Victorian writers. He sold all his novels twice. First, they were issued in nineteen monthly “parts”—thirty-two-page installments, with advertising, bound in paper and priced at a shilling. (The final installment was a “double part,” and cost two shillings.) Then the novels were published as books, in editions priced for different markets. The exceptions were novels he serialized weekly in magazines he edited and owned a piece of.

Demand was huge. The parts of Dickens’s last, unfinished novel, “The Mystery of Edwin Drood,” were selling at a rate of fifty thousand copies a month when he died. By contrast, the parts of George Eliot’s “Middlemarch” and William Makepeace Thackeray’s “Vanity Fair”—not exactly minor works by not exactly unknown authors, both of them adopting the method of publication Dickens had pioneered—sold an average of five thousand copies a month.

Dickens gave his full energy and attention to everything he did. People who saw him perform conjuring tricks, or act onstage, or read from his books, were amazed by his preparation and his panache. He loved the theatre, and many people thought that he could have been a professional actor. At his public readings to packed houses, audiences wept, they fainted, and they cheered.

None of the photographs and portraits of him seemed to his friends to do him justice, because they couldn’t capture the mobility of his features or his laugh. He dressed stylishly, even garishly, but he was personally without affectation or pretension. He avoided socializing with the aristocracy, and for a long time he refused to meet the Queen. He disliked argument and never dominated a conversation. He believed in fun, and wanted everything to be the best. “He did even his nothings in a strenuous way,” one of his closest friends said. “His was the brightest face, the lightest step, the pleasantest word.” Thackeray’s daughter Anne remembered that when Dickens came into a room “everybody lighted up.” His life force seemed boundless.

It was not, of course. He had heart and kidney troubles, and he aged prematurely. When he died, of a cerebral hemorrhage, in 1870, he was only fifty-eight. He had stipulated that he be buried without ceremony in a rural churchyard, but since he failed to specify the churchyard, his friends felt authorized to arrange for his burial in Westminster Abbey.

No one objected. “The man was a phenomenon, an exception, a special production,” the British politician Lord Shaftesbury wrote after Dickens’s death, and nearly everybody appears to have felt the same way. Dickens’s nickname for himself was the Inimitable. He was being semi-facetious, but it was true. There was no one like him.

You could say that Dickens lived like one of his own characters—always on, the Energizer Bunny of empathy and enjoyment. Good enough was never good enough. Wherever he was or whatever he was doing, life was histrionic, either a birthday party or a funeral. And, when you read the recollections of his contemporaries and the responses to his books from nineteenth-century readers, you can’t doubt his charisma or the impact his writing had. The twenty-four-year-old Henry James met Dickens in 1867, during Dickens’s second trip to America, and he remembered “how tremendously it had been laid upon young persons of our generation to feel Dickens, down to the soles of our shoes.”

But even the Bunny sooner or later runs out of room, hits a wall, or tumbles off the edge of the table, and Dickens had his crisis. It was in the cards.

Robert Douglas-Fairhurst describes his new book on Dickens, “The Turning Point” (Knopf), as a “slow biography.” Douglas-Fairhurst teaches at Oxford, and this is his second book on Dickens. “Becoming Dickens,” a study of the early years, came out in 2011. In this book, he takes up a single year in Dickens’s life and walks us through it virtually week by week. The year is 1851, which Douglas-Fairhurst calls “a turning point for Dickens, for his contemporaries, and for the novel as a form.” He never quite nails the claim. It’s not a hundred per cent clear why 1851 is a key date in British history, or why “Bleak House,” the book Dickens began to write that year, is a key work in the history of the novel.

But Douglas-Fairhurst realizes his intention, which is to enrich our appreciation of the social, political, and literary circumstances in which Dickens conceived “Bleak House.” And, as advertised, “The Turning Point” is granular. You learn a lot about life in mid-century England, with coverage of things like the bloomer craze—a fashion of short skirts with “Turkish” trousers worn by women—and mesmerism. (Dickens was intrigued by mesmerism as a form of therapy, and he became, naturally, an adept hypnotist.)

Still, Dickens did not begin writing “Bleak House” until November, 1851, and this means that most of “The Turning Point” consists of closeups of Dickens editing his magazine Household Words; producing a play called “Not So Bad as We Seem,” which apparently was pretty bad; running a home for “fallen women,” Urania Cottage, with its benefactor, the banking heiress Angela Burdett-Coutts; and buying and renovating a large house on Tavistock Square, in London.

Was 1851 a “turning point” for the United Kingdom? The eighteen-forties were a rocky decade politically and economically. There were mass protests in England, famine in Ireland, and revolutionary uprisings on the Continent. After 1850, economies rebounded, dissent subsided, and England enjoyed two decades of prosperity, an era known as “the Victorian high noon.” But it would be hard to identify something from 1851 that caused the European world to turn this corner. Robert Tombs, in his entertaining and sometimes contrarian book “The English and Their History” (2014), suggests that it was the discovery of gold in California and Australia in 1849 that triggered the boom. Suddenly there was a lot more money, and therefore a lot more liquidity.

In Dickens’s own career, the turning point had, in a sense, come earlier, in 1848, with the commercial success of “Dombey and Son.” After that, he knew he could command large sums, and he never worried about money again. “Bleak House,” published five years later, is a more ambitious book, but it is based on a thesis Dickens set out for the first time in the “Thunderbolt” chapter of “Dombey”: “It might be worthwhile, sometimes, to inquire what Nature is, and how men work to change her, and whether, in the enforced distortions so produced, it is not natural to be unnatural.”

This marks the moment when Dickens’s literary imagination acquired its sociological dimension. We behave inhumanely not because of our natures but because of the way the system forces us to live. Dickens’s contemporary and near-neighbor Karl Marx thought the same thing. “How men work to change her”—how we transform nature into the goods we need—was what Marx called “the means of production.”

“Bleak House” is what is known as a condition-of-England novel. The phrase was coined by a writer Dickens knew and liked, Thomas Carlyle, whose style—a mixture of Old Testament brimstone and German Romanticism, with frequent apostrophizing of the reader—Dickens sometimes adopted. Half the chapters in “Bleak House” are written in the historical present, the tense Carlyle used in “The French Revolution,” a book that Dickens said he read five hundred times.

Condition-of-England novels like “Bleak House” are generally thought of in relation to what John Ruskin called “illth.” Illth is the underside of wealth, the damage that change leaves in its wake, the human cost of progress. Novels show what statistics miss or disguise: what life was actually like, for many people, in the most advanced economy in the world.

Dickens was a social critic. Almost all his fiction satirizes the institutions and social types produced by that dramatic transformation of the means of production. But he was not a revolutionary. His heroes are not even reformers. They are ordinary people who have made a simple commitment to decency. George Orwell, who had probably aspired to recruit Dickens to the socialist cause, reluctantly concluded that Dickens was not interested in political reform, only in moral improvement: “Useless to change institutions without a change of heart—that, essentially, is what he is always saying.”

In fact, a major target of Dickens’s satire is liberalism. We associate liberalism with caring about the poor and the working class, which Dickens obviously did. But in nineteenth-century England the typical liberal was a utilitarian, who believed that the worth of a social program could be measured by cost-benefit analysis, and very likely a Malthusian, who thought it necessary to lower the birth rate so that the population would not outstrip the food supply.

This was the thinking behind the legislation known as the New Poor Law, whose consequences Dickens satirizes unforgettably in the opening chapters of “Oliver Twist.” The New Poor Law was a progressive welfare measure. It was a reform. To take another example: Mr. Gradgrind, in “Hard Times,” is not a capitalist or a factory owner. He’s a utilitarian. He thinks that what’s holding people back is folk wisdom and superstition. Dickens is on the side of folk wisdom.

One of Dickens’s memorable caricatures in “Bleak House” is Mrs. Jellyby, and she, too, is easily misread. We see her at home obsessively devoted to her “Africa” project, while neglecting, almost criminally, her own children. (In the Dickens world, mistreating a child is the worst sin you can commit.) But Dickens is not ridiculing Mrs. Jellyby for caring about Africans. As Douglas-Fairhurst tells us, she was based on a woman Dickens had met, Caroline Chisholm, who operated a charity called the Family Colonization Loan Society, which helped poor English people emigrate. And Mrs. Jellyby’s project is the same: she is raising money for families to move to a place called Borrioboola-Gha, “on the left bank of the Niger,” so that there will be fewer mouths to feed in England. She’s a Malthusian.

Douglas-Fairhurst picked 1851 as a turning point because of the Great Exhibition, and he is right that “Bleak House” is best understood as Dickens’s answer to that event. The Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations was a world’s fair. More than forty nations sent their inventions and natural treasures—a hundred thousand in all—for display in a building known as the Crystal Palace, a glass-and-cast-iron structure, like a gigantic greenhouse, 1,848 feet long and 456 feet wide, designed and erected for the Exhibition in Hyde Park.

The Exhibition was a monument to the Victorian faith in progress and free trade, and it was attended with enormous fanfare. Prince Albert, a big-tech enthusiast, was an organizer. In the five and a half months that the Exhibition ran, from May to October, 1851, the Crystal Palace had six million visitors. Receipts totalled a hundred and eighty-six thousand pounds, the equivalent of twenty-seven million pounds today.

This kind of vainglorious self-regard disgusted Dickens. When people are suffering in your own back yard, how can you strut around congratulating yourself on your latest inventions, or how much pig iron you are producing? He imagined “another Exhibition—for a great display of England’s sins and negligences . . . this dark Exhibition of the bad results of our doings!” His counter-exhibition to that palace of crystal would be a bleak house. Bleak House in the novel is not an unhappy place. It is decent and unpretentious. And that is what he thought England should aspire to become.

In “Bleak House,” Dickens wanted to show London from the underside, and he knew the underside well. Before he was a novelist, he was a reporter, and, later on, many of his walks were on London streets, sometimes at night and often in the sketchiest neighborhoods. In 1851, London was the world’s largest city, the political and financial center of a nation whose possessions stretched from New Zealand to South America—an empire on which the sun never set—and whose gross domestic product was the highest in the world. But on the street it was not the place you see on “Masterpiece Theatre.”

Dickens is always accused of exaggeration. Tombs, in “The English and Their History,” complains that we have a distorted idea of living conditions in the Victorian era because we see them through the lens of Dickens’s novels. But what look like exaggerations in “Bleak House” are not simply literary conceits. The novel opens:

London. . . . As much mud in the streets as if the waters had but newly retired from the face of the earth. . . . Foot passengers, jostling one another’s umbrellas in a general infection of ill temper, and losing their foot-hold at street-corners, where tens of thousands of other foot passengers have been slipping and sliding since the day broke (if this day ever broke), adding new deposits to the crust upon crust of mud, sticking at those points tenaciously to the pavement, and accumulating at compound interest.

Do readers ever wonder where all that mud came from? The answer is that there were twenty-four thousand horses in London, and you cannot toilet-train a horse. Horse-drawn conveyance was how people got around. And a horse produces forty-odd pounds of manure a day. There was also a wholesale meat market in central London, to which 1.8 million cattle, pigs, and sheep were driven through the streets every year. When people who lived in the countryside visited London for the first time, they were surprised to find that the entire city smelled like a stable.

Crossing the street could be an adventure, particularly for women in the full-length dresses and petticoats they wore in the eighteen-fifties, and this gave work to crossing sweepers, who made their living by clearing a path in the hope of a tip. (It also may explain the bloomer craze.) The term for street filth was “mud,” but that was a euphemism. Four-fifths of London mud was shit.

The population had outgrown the space. In 1800, a million people lived in London; by 1850, there were more than 2.6 million, and another two hundred thousand walked into the city every day to work. Sidewalks were congested. A German visitor complained that a Londoner “will run against you, and make you revolve on your own axis, without so much as looking around to see how you feel after the shock.” Dickens’s “tens of thousands of other foot passengers have been slipping and sliding since the day broke” is not hyperbole.

Nor is “if this day ever broke.” That’s the other opening image, fog:

Fog everywhere. Fog up the river, where it flows among green aits and meadows; fog down the river, where it rolls defiled among the tiers of shipping and the waterside pollutions of a great (and dirty) city. Fog on the Essex marshes, fog on the Kentish heights. Fog creeping into the cabooses of collier-brigs; fog lying out on the yards and hovering in the rigging of great ships; fog drooping on the gunwales of barges and small boats.

The Thames had long been an open sewer, choked with refuse, carcasses of dead animals, and human remains—“the waterside pollutions of a great (and dirty) city.” London had no properly functioning sewer system. Human waste accumulated in two hundred thousand cesspools, many of which went uncleaned for years. Even the basements of Buckingham Palace smelled of feces. The waste leached into the groundwater. Cholera is transmitted by contaminated drinking water, and between 1831 and 1866 there were three major cholera outbreaks in London. Tens of thousands died.

The stretch of the Thames that London lies on is naturally foggy, but nineteenth-century fog was a mixture of water vapor and smoke from coal fires, and it enveloped the city. You could see it from a long way off. “London’s own black wreath,” Wordsworth called it. The fog smelled of sulfur; it made the mud on the streets turn black; and it left a coating of soot on every surface. People had to wash their faces after they had been outside. The term “smog”—smoke plus fog—was coined to describe London air.

The images Dickens chose to open his novel are images of literal pollution, but they are also metaphors for moral pollution, the corruption of human nature by vanity, greed, and ethical blindness. If you replace “mud” with “dung,” as the Victorians called animal waste, you get the metaphor, and “compound interest” gives the clue. Money taints everything. “Filthy lucre” is the phrase used in the King James Bible. Jarndyce v. Jarndyce, the Chancery case at the center of the novel that ruins the lives of several of its characters, is a dispute over a will—a dispute about money. So when, in court, a barrister addresses the Lord Chancellor as “Mlud” he is calling him a piece of shit.

The London of “Bleak House” is a sink of addiction, disease, and death. One character is disfigured by smallpox; another is disabled by a stroke. A character spontaneously combusts from alcoholism, and one dies of an opium overdose. A poor woman’s baby dies; a child is born deaf and mute; and four characters perish prematurely of disease, exhaustion, or despair. One character is murdered.

The central figure in the book, appropriately, is a crossing sweeper, named Jo. We are made to understand that he contracts cholera in the slum where he sleeps, called Tom-All-Alone’s, and his death is the principal display in Dickens’s “dark Exhibition.” Dickens had originally considered using “Tom-All-Alone’s” as the title of the book.

Dickens’s novels are not just social criticism, though. Considering that his method of publication prevented him from revising, the thematic and imagistic intricacy of the books is remarkable. Each of the major novels is constructed around an institution—the poorhouse in “Oliver Twist,” Chancery in “Bleak House,” the prison in “Little Dorrit”—that gives Dickens a figurative language to use throughout the story. Shakespeare composed in a similar way: blindness in “King Lear,” blood in “Macbeth.” Once you start looking for these tropes, you find them woven into everything.

In “Bleak House,” Dickens uses two narrators who split the chapters between them—an innovation contemporary reviewers seem to have completely missed. In fact, all of Dickens’s later novels, beginning with “Bleak House,” were largely ignored or dismissed by reviewers. They complained that the books were formless, labored, too dark. They wanted more of the early, funny stuff.

Reviewers in Dickens’s time generally did not complain about what modern readers find hard to process: the melodrama, the rhetorical overkill, the staggering load of schmaltz. The comic characters are still astonishingly vivid. You get them right away. They might have stepped out of a Pixar movie. And it’s in throwaway scenes, comic episodes with no special dramatic importance, that we can see what made Dickens inimitable—in “Bleak House,” for example, when the law clerk Mr. Guppy takes two friends to lunch. They are Victorian-era bros, swaggering and clueless, a young male type Dickens loved. Any novelist today would kill to be able to produce such a scene. Dickens made dozens.

But, possibly because of the demands of serial publication, Dickens’s comic figures run through their whole repertoire of tics each time they appear, and the plots, highly contrived to begin with, are stretched out, on the “Perils of Pauline” theory of leaving the audience eager for the next installment, far beyond the point of novelistic plausibility or readerly patience. And the author sermonizes freely. “Dead, your Majesty,” the narrator in “Bleak House” intones on the death of Jo the crossing sweeper. “Dead, my lords and gentlemen. Dead, right reverends and wrong reverends of every order. Dead, men and women, born with heavenly compassion in your hearts. And dying thus around us every day.”

Everything is underlined, usually twice. Still, that was the stuff the Victorians loved. Grown men wept at the fate of Florence Dombey and the death of Little Nell, in “The Old Curiosity Shop.”

The utopia of Dickens’s fiction, also impossibly outdated today, maybe even outdated in 1850, is the domestic idyll. The nuclear family is the touchstone of “naturalness” in his books, and its anchor is a woman who exemplifies all the bourgeois virtues—like Esther Summerson, in “Bleak House.” Fallen women, like Lady Dedlock, Esther’s natural mother, are punished, doomed, in her case, to die in a paupers’ cemetery, sprawled across the grave of her lover.

In life, there is little evidence that Dickens was, in the context of his time and place, a sexist or a prude. He did think that most women were happiest in the home, but he treated with respect the “fallen women” whom he and Burdett-Coutts supported, refused to allow religious teachings in the house, and did not expect the women to express regret or repentance. He just wanted them to be able to lead conventional lives. Jenny Hartley, in “Charles Dickens and the House of Fallen Women” (2008), estimates that in the years Dickens ran the home he successfully rehabilitated a hundred women. He never made his association with it public.

Dickens thought that it was perfectly suitable for talented women to have careers. His older sister, Fanny, whom he adored, was a professional musician. He serialized Elizabeth Gaskell’s novels “Cranford” and “North and South” in Household Words. He admired George Eliot’s work and appears to have been the first person to guess that it was written by a woman. And he worked with many actresses in the theatre. One of these was Ellen Ternan.

The only thing that makes sense about the Ellen Ternan story is that, when they met, Dickens was forty-five and famous; she was eighteen, not famous, and relatively unprotected; and he fell for her. Such things happen. But the rest is a puzzle.

Dickens could have taken up with Nelly (as everyone called her) without undue scandal. There would have been talk, but he was Charles Dickens, and it was understood that actresses played by different rules. The great English actress Ellen Terry left the stage to live with a married man and had two children with him, then returned and resumed a successful career. In Dickens’s own circle, there were plenty of unconventional arrangements. The novelist Wilkie Collins, his good friend and dramatic collaborator, had two women in his life, neither of whom he married. Dickens’s illustrator George Cruikshank supported two families. George Eliot lived with a man, George Henry Lewes, who was in an open marriage to another woman—and moral seriousness was George Eliot’s brand.

Or Dickens and Ellen Ternan could simply have had a discreet affair. Instead, he turned the whole business into a spectacle. In a letter that he had his agent leak to the press, and that he subsequently published a version of in the Times, he accused his wife, Catherine, of being mentally disturbed and claimed that her children had never loved her, and he defended, in language so indignant that it gave the game completely away, the purity of the woman rumor had already associated him with.

He reached a settlement agreement (not ungenerous) with Catherine, then forbade their children to see her. Meanwhile, he set up Nelly in her own house, a short distance by train from his home, Gad’s Hill, in Kent, and would sneak off to see her. There is good reason to believe that Nelly became pregnant; that Dickens sequestered her in France, making frequent surreptitious visits to her; and that a child was born there who either died in infancy or was put up for adoption.

They kept this going for thirteen years, until Dickens died. Nelly outlived him by almost forty-four years. She married and had two children. But she seems not to have told her husband, at least at first, and she never told her children, that she had once been the mistress of Charles Dickens.

Almost no one thought that Dickens behaved well, and he lost some friends, including Burdett-Coutts. But it was his treatment of Catherine as much as the liaison with Nelly that made people drop him. Claire Tomalin, who has written biographies of both Ternan and Dickens, suggests that Nelly insisted on the separation, that if she had only been a little naughtier and given him what he wanted, things would not have got out of hand.

It seems likely, though, that Dickens was the one insisting on the “just friends” pretense and the deception. Whether or not he really loved Catherine or Nelly—and he was a passionate man; there is no reason to suppose he didn’t love them—there was one thing he loved more, something that he had brought into the world and that belonged to him alone: his readership. He called it the “particular relation (personally affectionate and like no other man’s) which subsists between me and the public.” He could not show readers that the Charles Dickens they knew from the books was not the real Charles Dickens. He must have felt that his only play was to blame the breakup of his marriage on his wife, and for once he miscalculated. But it was a choice between betraying his feelings for Nelly and betraying his fans. He tried, madly, to keep both. The stress may have killed him.

He began his public readings in earnest in 1858, the year he separated from Catherine. And from then until his death he was on an endless tour. He sold out arenas across England, Ireland, Scotland, and the United States. His health was failing, but he gave every reading his histrionic last ounce. Sometimes, when it was over, he had to be helped off the stage. But he kept on, even after his friends and doctors begged him to slow down. It was manic. He is estimated to have given four hundred and seventy-two public readings.

The accounts left by people who attended them make it clear that these were not like most author readings, where it is easy for the attention to wander. This was theatre. Here is a description:

In the glare of the gas-burners shining down upon him from the pendant screen immediately above his head, his individuality, to so express it, altogether disappeared, and we saw before us instead, just as the case might happen to be, Mr. Pickwick, or Mrs. Gamp, or Mr. Marigold, or little Paul Dombey, or Mr. Squeers, or Sam Weller, or Mr. Peggotty, or some other of those immortal personages.

And this, in a way, is the solution to the problem of reading Dickens. As Ruskin once explained it, Dickens “chooses to speak in a circle of stage fire.” The reason the books are melodramatic is that they are melodrama. If you’re looking for something else, read Anthony Trollope. The best generic counterpart to Dickens is the Broadway musical, where feelings are splashed with color, where people dance and break into song, where every complication can be magically resolved by showing a little heart, and all join hands at the final curtain. As hokey as it seems in the cold light of day, Broadway audiences suspend their skepticism for the pleasure of the performers and the spectacle.

Some people may wish that life could be like a Broadway musical. A few people may even believe that life essentially is a Broadway musical, or at least that we can make it so if we commit ourselves to living like that day by day. That seems to be the kind of person Dickens was. He tried to make life as enchanting as a show. When the enchantment began to curdle, when complications arose that could not be resolved in a curtain call, he went onstage himself. And there, believing in their immortality, their immunity from time and change, he disappeared into his own creations. ?

Friday, February 25, 2022

The power of water

 The power of water

Giulio Boccaletti in Aeon:



Far more potent than oil or gold, water is a stream of geopolitical force that runs deep, feeding crops and building nations

A great river encircles the world. It rises in the heartland of the United States and carries more water than the Mississippi and Yangtze rivers combined. One branch, its oldest, streams over the Atlantic, heading for Europe and the Middle East. Another crosses the Pacific, flowing towards China. Countless tributaries join along the way, draining the plains and forests of Latin America, Europe and Asia.

You probably have never heard of such a river, even though almost all of us draw from it. You cannot fish in it, float on it, drink from it. If you were to look, you would not find it: it is invisible. Yet there is no doubt that it flows.

The river starts anywhere water feeds agriculture. But from there, physical water vanishes, replaced by a flow of crops that carry only the memory of the water used to produce them. Crops then travel along the shipping lanes of the global trade system, eventually displacing the water that would have otherwise been used to grow them locally. Thus, water flows from source to destination ‘embedded’ in its products. It is a flow of ‘virtual water’, an idea first developed in the 1980s by the late geographer Tony Allan.

This great virtual river helps explain how nations exercise power over each other. It is far from a coincidence that its dominant source today is the waters of the Mississippi. Its current path was established when Franklin Roosevelt’s US replaced Britain as the world’s hegemon. The US began feeding an imploding, war-torn Europe with crops nourished by the rich waters of Old Man River, and the rest is history.

In 1947, Thomas Hart Benton painted a celebrated allegory of this transition, Achelous and Hercules: a youthful US Army Corp of Engineers, cast in the role of Hercules, fights the Missouri River – Achelous, the river god, in the shape of a bull – while the Midwestern farmland fills a proleptic Cornucopia with food headed east. The US had become the postwar granary of the world.


Achelous and Hercules (1947), by Thomas Hart Benton. Courtesy the Smithsonian American Art Museum

Benton’s geopolitical reference in Ovid’s myth might seem obscure today. But he could be confident that, when the average customer of Harzfeld’s store in Kansas City glanced at that mural above the elevators, near the perfumery section – the location of the original commission – she would have recognised the elemental nature of water, the struggle that shaped the rural landscape of the 1940s, and the power that water control gave to the nation.

Streams of power and identity run deep in the waters of the great virtual river.

All through the 20th century, trading the products of a country’s water resources was an act of power. When the US became the granary of the world, flooding food eastward, it also provoked a countercurrent of hard currency streaming back to pay for it, setting the stage for the Bretton Woods settlement.

Lenin and Stalin paid for Soviet industrialisation with cereal production of Ukrainian, Russian and Central Asian fields, irrigated by canals built by thousands of Gulag prisoners. In China, Mao may well have measured the targets of the Great Leap Forward in tons of steel, but planned to fund their pursuit by irrigating the plains of the Yangtze and Yellow rivers.

Ibn Saud knew that oil might make him wealthy, but only water to irrigate Saudi Arabia would give him power, so the former paid for the latter. And the 1970s postcolonial competition for regional influence over water reached a peak when the pan-Arabism of Egypt’s president Gamal Abdel Nasser collided with Israel’s claims over the Jordan River, seeding conflicts that – from the Arab Spring to the Syrian crisis – have contributed to shaping the contemporary world.

Yet the geopolitical value of water ended up hidden from view. A thick layer of 20th-century industrialisation concealed the force of water behind countless dams and vast embankments, replumbing the planet and fooling people into believing that modernity had emancipated their life from concerns about water.

Its roots reach back to the dawn of history, a bridge between past and present we still stand on today

It was a dangerous illusion. Industrialisation did not emancipate nations from the huge system of water embedded in global trade: it built on it. The recent trade war between China and the US – ostensibly about intellectual property, from solar panels and flat-screen televisions to telecommunications technology – focused a good part of the action (and much of the rhetoric) on soybean, the largest US crop export to China and a central product of the Mississippi-Missouri valley. Behind the scenes, water and the great river continue to matter.

But where does this deep nexus between geopolitics and water come from? The answer lies in the past, in a particular story of water and empire that predates the so-called ‘American Century’. Its roots reach back to the dawn of history, a bridge between past and present so secure that we all still stand on it today, while the great virtual river, unseen, streams under us.

Over the course of the 19th century, the British Empire introduced the blueprint of the globalised world we still inhabit. The planet is littered with the consequences of this vast experiment in conquest, from the conflicts of the Middle East and Afghanistan to the postcolonial struggles of Africa and the Indian subcontinent.

While most contemporary talk of empire echoes that age, the British were far less sanguine about their imperial dreams than the lyrics of ‘Rule, Britannia!’ might suggest. A deep anxiety gnawed at the brittle foundations of their identity. They fashioned themselves as rightful heirs of Rome, yet could not escape the cautionary tale of The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776-89) by Edward Gibbons. Was decline and fall their destiny too?

Assuaging this anxiety required digging deeper roots. For a self-identified pious society in the throes of the Darwinian revolution, the ancient past was the principal source of comfort. The archaeologists of the 19th century were in the business of biblical confirmation: searching for evidence of Old Testament stories. Finding them would prove that the British were blessed with Augustinian universality: a Christian commonwealth, filled with purpose and piety, which marked the terminus of a human story that began with Noah’s flood.

So, the spades of archaeologists began digging. The Near East, the theatre of the biblical text, was their target. As they dug through sand, rock and time, they found water.

On 3 December 1872, London was overcast. A 150-year-old weather report from that Tuesday describes a foggy morning, followed by rain. By close of day, a northerly cold wind had partly cleared the clouds. The next day would be freezing.


That evening, at the Society for Biblical Archaeology on 9 Conduit Street, George Smith, a 32-year-old bearded Assyriologist, prepared to speak, paper in hand. Expectations were high. The Daily Telegraph had printed a preview of his findings two weeks earlier. As a result, the room was packed. William Gladstone, the then prime minister, had chosen to attend.

Chairing was Major General Sir Henry Rawlinson, the British Museum supervisor in charge of the Mesopotamian excavations at Nineveh and Babylon. Years earlier in the Kurdish mountains, Rawlinson had deciphered the rock of Behistun, producing a Rosetta stone of cuneiform language. Access to Near East history had snowballed after that. With it, the search for imperial identity. Rawlinson sponsored the retrieval of thousands of artefacts, filling the halls of the British Museum. A team led by Hormuzd Rassam, an Iraqi-British archaeologist, retrieved more than 20,000 fragmented tablets from the ancient library of Ashurbanipal in Nineveh.

Assyrian objects flooded Britain, and London found itself in the grip of an Assyrian craze. However, finding those tablets and getting them to London had been far easier than making sense of them. Desperate for manpower, Rawlinson hired Smith, the Assyriologist now standing in front of the audience in Conduit Street.

Utnapishtim had been instructed by a god to build a vessel to escape a destructive flood

A child of a working-class Chelsea family, Smith had left school at 14 to apprentice in a publishing house, and would not have made an obvious choice for an Assyriologist. But early in life he had developed a passion for biblical history. Time in the British Museum turned a fascination for cuneiform writing into a singular proficiency for translation.

By November 1872, he had been labouring under contract for 10 years, tirelessly examining fragments from the prodigious catalogue of tablets. He was looking for myths. Then, finally, he assembled 80 fragments to form a single epic on 12 tablets. He had struck gold.

The protagonist of Smith’s epic was King Gilgamesh, builder of the great walls of Uruk, the 4th-millennium BCE city-state of Sumer. He was accompanied by Enkidu, a wild man created by the gods. The 11th tablet in their story made history. Standing in front of the prime minister, Smith began reading: ‘A short time back I discovered among the Assyrian tablets in the British Museum, an account of the flood.’ His paper was titled ‘The Chaldean Account of the Deluge’.

The tablet described how Gilgamesh, distraught by the death of Enkidu, set out to find Utnapishtim, ‘the faraway’, to learn the secret of immortality. Utnapishtim told Gilgamesh the most extraordinary story: of how he had been instructed by a god to build a vessel to escape a destructive flood, and that he had been given a mandate to save himself and his animals. He floated endlessly, even sending out a dove to seek land. Eventually, he landed on mount Urartu as the floodwaters drained away.

The tale of Utnapishtim thrilled and astonished Smith’s listeners. It was Noah’s story of the flood from the Old Testament. But, according to Smith, the text had been written well before 1700 BCE, or 1,000 years before the writing of the Bible. The revelation of biblical confirmation hit London’s elite like a thunderbolt. The British had succeeded: to many, this was proof that the biblical text was recording real events. A deluge, in fact.

Intolerable amounts of water would have struck a familiar note with Smith’s Victorian audience. Most British wealth still belonged to landed aristocracy and, although industrialisation had moved more people off farms than in any other country, the first sector still employed a quarter of the British labour force.

The 1870s had been the wettest years since records began – in 1872 alone, more than a metre of rain had drenched England – and all cereal-producing regions were hit. Besides, surrounded by an overpopulated 19th-century London, with cholera outbreaks and an open sewer for the Thames, the stories of ancient people struggling with water would have been more than evocative.

Not only did the British think they had physically confirmed the Word of God, providing them with an extraordinary claim to universality, they had discovered the traces of an ancient empire whose roots, like theirs, were planted in water. The fate of the British Empire felt inescapably connected to its relationship to water.

Smith was not done yet. The Victorian world was so spellbound by his revelations, that he was able to persuade the editor of The Daily Telegraph to finance a new expedition. In January 1873, Smith set off again for Nineveh. By May, he was digging. Almost immediately, he hit on fragments of another epic, the even more ancient Atrahasis.

In the world of Atrahasis, one with no humans, gods were organised in a hierarchy. Lesser gods were forced to maintain canals under the guidance of the god Ennugi, the canals controller. Eventually, the gods tired of having to do all the work, and created man to do the digging for them. In Mesopotamian myth, human beings existed to manage irrigation. People existed to struggle with water.

Water was no longer just nourishment for agriculture, but also the principal infrastructure of empire

Such myths reflected the experience of Mesopotamia, where the sedentary model of the Fertile Crescent during the Neolithic exploded in southern Mesopotamia, around the 5th millennium BCE, into a more mobile state of affairs. Societies living at the boundary of the Euphrates River and the Persian Gulf engaged in intensive food production to support remarkably complex institutions. Rivers were the heart of their story.

The flood regime of the Tigris and Euphrates depends on snowmelt from the Taurus and Zagros mountains. It made life very difficult for early Mesopotamian settlers. Floodwaters reached the fields at harvesting, the wrong time, requiring a complex system of canals and moveable dams to manage them. To mobilise the unpaid labour needed to operate this complicated system, the communities of the Uruk period had to rely on concentrated power, embodied by permanent theocratic hierarchies. The first city-states had emerged.



As cities along the rivers grew, occupying more of the linear embankments, they encroached on each other’s territory, entering into conflict. Eventually, they accreted into the first empire, Akkad. And, with this, water was no longer just nourishment for agriculture, but also the principal infrastructure joining together an empire. The story of Gilgamesh had first been written in Akkadian.

Over time, many Bronze Age civilisations developed – most of them did so by harnessing their water resources – until a system of trade emerged that included Assyrians, Hittites, Mycenaeans, Egyptians and more. Their trade included crops. We know this, because records have survived of the Hittite King pleading for emergency food shipments from his arch-nemesis, the Pharaoh of Egypt, when drought hit.

Smith and the 19th-century archaeologists he worked with would never have described it in these terms, of course, but they had contributed to revealing the first virtual river in history. The story of empire was inseparable from the story of water.

Nineteenth-century exploration of the deep past accompanied a transformation of the present. In 1858, after the East India Company had spent decades exploiting the textile industry of Bengal, rule of India passed to the British Raj. From then on, the British concentrated their imperial aspirations on irrigated agriculture in India.

That year, Rawlinson joined parliament and the newly formed India Council. The likes of Rawlinson feared Russia’s imperial ambitions for India, which, through Afghanistan, would have entered the subcontinent via the floodplains of the Indus.

In his treatise on The Wealth of Nations (1776), Adam Smith had posited that the relative success of states depended on the reach of their fluvial system, which – he thought – defined both size of markets and complexity of division of labour. He believed that ancient Egypt, China and India had been long-lasting societies in their time because of their vast, indigenous fluvial networks. Not surprisingly, the British invested accordingly.

Capital from London underwrote canals on the Indus to improve the connectivity and productivity of Punjabi farms. The scale of investment – particularly after the American Civil War broke out, closing off westward finance – was astonishing. In 1800, about 800,000 hectares were under irrigation in India. By 1900, they had grown to 13 million.

The title ‘Empress of India’ crystallised the source of the great river at the heart of the empire

Indian irrigated production became the heart of the imperial system of trade. The plains of India produced raw materials, sold to the rest of the world to balance the import of goods to England. In particular, China’s purchases of Indian opium balanced the extraordinary quantities of tea that Britain imported from the Celestial Empire, a trade perceived to be important enough to justify two Opium Wars. In their pursuit of an odd mix of liberalism and imperialism, the British had knitted together a vast system of trade that fed a 19th-century virtual river, the first truly global one in history.

Smith, meanwhile, went back for two more rounds of excavations in 1874 and 1876. His last trip was in July 1876, just a few months after Benjamin Disraeli had convinced parliament to bestow on Queen Victoria the title of ‘Empress of India’, crystallising the source of the great river at the heart of the empire.

He would never see England again. Smith fell ill and died in Aleppo. He was 36. The stories of Gilgamesh and Atrahasis – myths that contributed to feeding a water-led view of power that persists to this day – were his legacy.

Finally, at the beginning of the 20th century, the British Empire met the destiny it was trying to avoid. Finding identity in the deep past did nothing to compensate for flawed economics, poor management and global conflicts. It declined and, effectively, fell a few decades into the 20th century. But the great virtual flow it had established did not dry up with it. It moved.

Only half a century earlier, the American Republic had been a radical project on the verge of collapse in a bloody civil war. After the First World War, however, it took the mantle of global leader, first by exporting its agricultural products to Europe, then by exporting something else: a water-led modernist model of development that had begun with engineering the Panama Canal and was trained in the harsh conditions of the American West.

Karl Marx believed that material conditions determined political outcomes. He thought that difficult water conditions would necessarily give rise to a despotic managerial state, such as that in Qing China. But during the 20th century, countries around the world replumbed their landscape on the model not of a despot, but of the world’s largest democratic republic.

The archetypes of the US model – Hoover Dam, the Tennessee Valley Authority, countless other projects of the Bureau of Reclamation and the US Army Corp of Engineers – inspired the world to replumb their land to harness the power of water, protect industrialisation from its force, and increase agricultural production through irrigation.

Whether seen or not, the deep connection between water and global trade had been permanently set

The improvements in water infrastructure augmented the capacity of countries. Food production grew. Globalisation intensified. When oil extraction expanded, a vast flow of crude headed west to power the postwar US and European economies, while food flowed towards the Middle East and North Africa. Food, energy and water became entangled in a tightening nexus. The great virtual river swelled.

Then, Deng Xiaoping untethered China from the Soviet Union and hooked it to US demand for products instead. Drunk with consumption, people began believing that the modernist model of the 20th century was a thing of the past. State-led engineering of the US water landscape had run out of steam, as the country’s public – tired of large government programmes – had turned decisively to market institutions.


Most people forgot the great river. If Benton had painted Achelous and Hercules today, his allegory would have been missed by the average customer of Macy’s or Walmart. But whether seen or not, the deep connection between water and global trade had been permanently set.

The drying of the Colorado River, the decimation of the forests of the Amazon and Congo basins, the flood-ridden plains of the Rhine and Yellow rivers, the disappearing wetlands of the Murray-Darling River are all evidence that a vast agricultural trade system continues to transform the face of the planet. And water continues to be its blueprint.

You cannot see the great virtual river, even if it continues to grow. But, unseen, it still matters. It shapes the environment we all live in. It creates powerful dependencies between nations. Above all, it is an expression of power. You might not be able to see it, but its shadow stretches behind you in time.

Just over 100 years after George Smith’s death, new lines were found on a fragment in Me-Turan, a new finale to the Epic of Gilgamesh. In them, the waters of the mighty Euphrates opened up, and the people of Uruk built a great stone tomb in the riverbed, to put their king to rest. As they sealed the tomb, waters flowed back, covering it forever. From then on, everyone knew Gilgamesh’s tomb was there. But no one could see it, under the surface of the water.

Sunday, February 20, 2022

This Is the Russia-China Friendship that Nixon Feared


This Is the Russia-China Friendship that Nixon Feared


By Farah Stockman Ms. Stockman is a member of the NY Times editorial board.


Mao Zedong arrived in Moscow in 1949 expecting to be feted for delivering China, the world’s most populous country, to Communism. Instead, Joseph Stalin humiliated him by making him wait for a meeting.

Although Stalin and Mao eventually signed a Treaty of Friendship, Mao chafed at being treated like a hayseed from a backward country. By the 1960s, Mao was openly feuding with the Soviets over leadership of the Communist world. The Soviet Union and China even battled each other in 1969 over disputed territory along their long border.

That created an opening for Richard Nixon’s trip to China on Feb. 21, 1972, a diplomatic overture aimed at peeling China away from the Soviet orbit.

In the short term, Nixon’s eight-day visit was an unambiguous success. Chinese leaders agreed to help spy on the Soviet Union. Nixon won re-election. The stage was set for China’s eventual integration into the global economy.

But as we mark the 50th anniversary of that visit, some U.S. officials and foreign policy analysts have second-guessed the wisdom of partnering with Beijing. Even Nixon apparently looked back on the strategy with mixed feelings, and possibly some regret. Russia was a military threat, but never an economic rival. China, however, is becoming the first power in a century capable of challenging American dominance on both economic and military terms.

Some American policymakers felt that China would eventually rise, with or without U.S. help. If you take that view, then welcoming China as a friendly partner, instead of a hostile power, made sense. Today, China has a far bigger stake in the international system and the U.S. economy than Nixon could have imagined possible.

Still, over the years, American policymakers have oversold the benefits of engaging China and have underplayed the risks. Steps by China toward a free-market economy didn’t turn it into a democracy, as many argued it would. And although a lot of American businessmen grew wealthy off China’s success, and American consumers were able to buy a lot of cheap stuff, many American workers suffered when factories moved to China. Over the last 20 years, Washington has been too preoccupied with the war on terrorism to think about how to prevent the United States from becoming too dependent on a Communist country that could prove to be fundamentally at odds with us.

President Xi Jinping of China makes no secret of his view that of the United States is a fading superpower that is intent on blocking China’s ascent to its rightful place in the world. Donald Trump slapped tariffs on Chinese goods, bringing an era of hopeful engagement to an end. But Mr. Trump’s isolationism benefited China, which filled the void of America’s global retreat. President Biden, who has rallied Europe, Australia and Japan with talk of fighting autocracy and making democracy bloom around the world, presents a thornier problem for Mr. Xi.

If the United States and Europe remain united, they form an economic bloc that is still roughly twice the size of China’s economy. But by framing the struggle as a fight between the “free world” and dictatorship, the Biden administration risks pushing Russia and China closer together into what some are calling a “new axis of autocracy.” This time, Moscow is the little brother, seeking support from Beijing. It could prove to be among the most consequential geopolitical developments in decades.

“What the West is doing now is the exact opposite of what Nixon did back then,” Adrian Geiges, the co-author of the forthcoming “Xi Jinping: The Most Powerful Man in the World,” told me. “Russia and China are not natural partners. They are partners because of the common enemy — the United States and Western Europe.”

It’s too early to tell how far China will stick its neck out for Russia in its confrontation with the West over Ukraine. China’s leaders have long argued for a world free of formal military alliances. They’ve been cautious about getting entangled in other countries’ military conflicts.

But President Vladimir Putin of Russia and President Xi took pains to present a common front recently when they issued an extraordinary joint statement hours before the opening night of the Winter Olympics in Beijing. The statement pledged that their cooperation would be “superior” to the one forged between the two countries during the Cold War. No area of cooperation would be off limits, presumably including Russia giving China its most advanced weaponry.

The two countries began edging closer together in 2014, after Russia’s invasion of Crimea prompted Western sanctions. Russia weathered the fallout with some support from China, which beefed up trade and its purchase of Russian oil and gas.

This month, the friendship appeared to break new ground. The statement marked the first time that China has supported Russia’s demand for an end to NATO expansion. By signing onto the text, Russia also supported China’s claim to Taiwan and both sides said they were “seriously concerned” about the U.S. decision to forge a military alliance with Britain and Australia and to cooperate “in the field of nuclear-powered submarines.”

President Putin and President Xi might not be natural allies, but they have an awful lot in common. Both see the United States as a chaotic hegemon. Both men were profoundly shaken by the collapse of the Soviet Union, which they viewed as a cautionary tale of what not to do. Both have clamped down hard on dissent and dispensed with or circumvented presidential term limits, paving the way for the potential to rule for life.

And both, longing to restore their countries’ role as great powers, are striving to recover territory that they see as having been lost to the West: Ukraine, in Russia’s case, and Taiwan, in the case of China.

The most striking thing about their statement was its sweeping declarations. It reads like a manifesto calling for the United States to recognize that it is no longer the boss of the world.

Two months after President Biden presided over a “democracy summit,” Mr. Putin and Mr. Xi assailed “certain states’ attempts to impose their own ‘democratic standards’ on other countries, to monopolize the right to assess the level of compliance with democratic criteria, to draw dividing lines based on the grounds of ideology.” The world has changed, they asserted. Russia and China should be respected as “world powers” that get to dictate what happens in their own backyards. The statement can be read as an attempt to peel America’s allies away, or to make Americans lose the will to fight.

The truth is that the world has changed. American democracy doesn’t look as shiny as it used to. Many people in around the world are tired of Westerners telling them what to do.

And yet the world is not jumping at the chance to be bossed around by the world’s largest surveillance states, either. It’s not an exaggeration to say that fate of the world depends on our ability to get the response to this “axis of autocracy” right. Americans have to stand up for our values and our allies without ending up in a catastrophic war. No matter how testy relations become, we should remember that the biggest threats we face today — climate change, the pandemic and nuclear proliferation — threaten Russia and China, too.


Saturday, February 19, 2022

Who Is Behind QAnon? Linguistic Detectives Find Fingerprints

Who Is Behind QAnon? Linguistic Detectives Find Fingerprints


Using machine learning, separate teams of computer scientists identified the same two men as likely authors of messages that fueled the viral movement.






By David D. Kirkpatrick

“Open your eyes,” the online post began, claiming, “Many in our govt worship Satan.”

That warning, published on a freewheeling online message board in October 2017, was the beginning of the movement now known as QAnon. Paul Furber was its first apostle.


The outlandish claim made perfect sense to Mr. Furber, a South African software developer and tech journalist long fascinated with American politics and conspiracy theories, he said in an interview. He still clung to “Pizzagate,” the debunked online lie that liberal Satanists were trafficking children from a Washington restaurant. He was also among the few who understood an obscure reference in the message to “Operation Mockingbird,” an alleged C.I.A. scheme to manipulate the news media.

As the stream of messages, most signed only “Q,” grew into a sprawling conspiracy theory, the mystery surrounding their authorship became a central fascination for its followers — who was the anonymous Q?

Now two teams of forensic linguists say their analysis of the Q texts show that Mr. Furber, one of the first online commentators to call attention to the earliest messages, actually played the lead role in writing them.

Sleuths hunting for the writer behind Q have increasingly overlooked Mr. Furber and focused their speculation on another QAnon booster: Ron Watkins, who operated a website where the Q messages began appearing in 2018 and is now running for Congress in Arizona. And the scientists say they found evidence to back up those suspicions as well. Mr. Watkins appears to have taken over from Mr. Furber at the beginning of 2018. Both deny writing as Q.

The studies provide the first empirical evidence of who invented the toxic QAnon myth, and the scientists who conducted the studies said they hoped that unmasking the creators might weaken its hold over QAnon followers. Some polls indicate that millions of people still believe that Q is a top military insider whose messages have revealed that former President Trump will save the world from a cabal of “deep state” Democratic pedophiles. QAnon has been linked to scores of violent incidents, many of the attackers who stormed the Capitol last year were adherents, and the F.B.I. has labeled the movement a potential terrorist threat.

The forensic analyses have not been previously reported. Two prominent experts in such linguistic detective work who reviewed the findings for The Times called the conclusions credible and persuasive.

In a telephone interview from his home near Johannesburg, Mr. Furber, 55, did not dispute that Q’s writing resembled his own. Instead, he claimed that Q’s posts had influenced him so deeply that they altered his prose.

Q’s messages “took over our lives, literally,” Mr. Furber said. “We all started talking like him.”

Linguistic experts said that was implausible, and the scientists who conducted the studies noted that their analyses included tweets by Mr. Furber from the first days Q emerged.


The Hidden Image Descriptions Making the Internet Accessible

Mr. Watkins, in a telephone interview, said, “I am not Q.”


But he also praised the posts. “There is probably more good stuff than bad,” he said, listing as examples “fighting for the safety of the country, and for the safety of the children of the country.” His campaign signs in the Republican primary refer to the online name he uses in QAnon circles, CodeMonkeyZ, and he acknowledged that much of the initial support for his campaign came from the movement. Relying mainly on small donors, Mr. Watkins, 34, trails the primary’s front-runners in fund-raising. (Two other Republicans who have expressed support for QAnon were elected in 2000 — Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene of Georgia and Representative Lauren Boebert of Colorado.)

Paul Furber @paul_furber · Mar 15, 2018

Questions the media should be asking:

- What is Tarrant's real background?

- Why did he travel to both NK and Pakistan recently?

- How did he get hold of so many restricted weapons?

- Why does his "manifesto" not ring true for a real 8chan denizen?

67 Nov 03, 2017 5:33:30 PM EDT

Anonymous ID: GVUvg1M7 No. 147816901

Where is John PODESTA?

Where is Tony PODESTA?

Did one or both escape the country and was let out?

WHERE IS BO?

WHERE WAS BO YESTERDAY?

What is the difference between commercial and private re: security clearance for departure?

4chan pol

Paul Furber @paul_furber · Mar 15, 2018

Questions the media should be asking:

- What is Tarrant's real background?

- Why did he travel to both NK and Pakistan recently?

- How did he get hold of so many restricted weapons?

- Why does his "manifesto" not ring true for a real 8chan denizen?

Mar 03, 2019, 6:17:55 PM EST

Q ID: 4c2e92 No. 5488382

Reading the comments on these Tweets further demonstrates the seriousness of media brainwashing in our Country whereby statements are considered fact w/o the need to provide proof.

Group-Think.

Control of the Narrative.

If enough people state the same thing w/o providing evidence and/or support does it become FACTUAL to those caught in the loop?

NATIONAL CRISIS.

Q

Ron Watkins @CodeMonkeyZ · Dec 27

We all know that @Mike_Pence has the complete authority to SAVE THE REPUBLIC on January 6.

If he takes decisive action as a LEADER on January 6, then VP Pence will surely be the 2024 Presidential front runner and will have HUGE SUPPORT to KAG in 2024!!

Computer scientists use machine learning to compare subtle patterns in texts that a casual reader could not detect. QAnon believers attribute this 2017 message to an anonymous military insider known as Q.

Paul Furber wrote this tweet after a mass shooting in New Zealand. Scientists who studied the Q posts say Mr. Furber played a leading role in writing the earliest, formative messages.

The scientists say that in 2018 a collaborator took control of the writing as Q: Ron Watkins. This message from Q appeared in 2019, and Mr. Watkins wrote this tweet shortly after the 2020 election.

The two analyses — one by Claude-Alain Roten and Lionel Pousaz of OrphAnalytics, a Swiss start-up; the other by the French computational linguists Florian Cafiero and Jean-Baptiste Camps — built on long-established forms of forensic linguistics that can detect telltale variations, revealing the same hand in two texts. In writing the Federalist Papers, for example, James Madison favored “whilst” over “while,” and Alexander Hamilton tended to write “upon” instead of “on.”

Instead of relying on expert opinion, the computer scientists used a mathematical approach known as stylometry. Practitioners say they have replaced the art of the older studies with a new form of science, yielding results that are measurable, consistent and replicable.

Sophisticated software broke down the Q texts into patterns of three-character sequences and tracked the recurrence of each possible combination.

Their technique does not highlight memorable, idiosyncratic word choices the way that earlier forensic linguists often did. But the advocates of stylometry note that they can quantify their software’s error rate.

The Swiss team said its accuracy rate was about 93 percent. The French team said its software correctly identified Mr. Watkins’s writing in 99 percent of tests and Mr. Furber’s in 98 percent.


Machine learning revealed that J.K. Rowling, the creator of Harry Potter, had written the 2013 mystery “Cuckoo’s Calling” under another pen name. The F.B.I. used a form of stylometry to show that Ted Kaczynski was the Unabomber. In recent years, such techniques have helped detectives in the United States and Britain solve murder cases involving a forged suicide note and faked text messages.

The teams studying Q got in touch with each other after the Swiss scientists released an earlier, preliminary study showing that the writing had changed over time. Each team applied different techniques. The Swiss scientists used software to measure similarities in the three-character patterns across multiple texts while comparing the complexity of vocabulary and syntax. The French team used a form of artificial intelligence that learns the patterns of an author’s writing in roughly the same way that facial-recognition software learns human features.

The teams shared text samples, including more than 100,000 words by Q and at least 12,000 words by each of the 13 other writers they analyzed.

Gerald McMenamin of the University of Nevada, Reno, a renowned forensic linguist critical of the machine-learning techniques, said he doubted that software could pick out the telltale individual variations from the quirks of the distinctive voice assumed in the Q messages — full of short sentences, cryptic statements, military jargon and Socratic questions.

Q’s messages “took over our lives, literally,” Paul Furber said. “We all started talking like him.”

To counter the danger that texts spanning different forms or genres might confuse the software, the scientists said, they compared other writing samples that were all of the same type: social media posts, primarily tweets. And the writings by Mr. Furber and Mr. Watkins stood out over all the others in similarity to Q’s.

David Hoover, an English professor at New York University and an expert in author identification, said the scientists seemed to effectively address the potential problem of Q’s distinctive voice. He found the work “quite persuasive,” he said.

“I’d buy it,” said Patrick Juola of Duquesne University, a mathematician who identified Ms. Rowling as the author of “Cuckoo’s Calling.”

“What’s really powerful is the fact that both of the two independent analyses showed the same overall pattern,” Dr. Juola added.

Neither team ruled out the possibility that other writers had contributed to Q’s thousands of messages, especially during what appears to have been a period of collaboration between Mr. Furber and Mr. Watkins around late 2017.

But the scientists relied on other facts to narrow the list of feasible writers to test. That evidence, the scientists said, increased their confidence that they had unmasked the main authors.

Some QAnon followers had begun to suspect as early as mid-2018 that one or more of the commentators who first claimed to stumble onto the Q messages had actually written them. Without prior knowledge, how could anyone have plucked those almost nonsensical postings out of the online torrent? An NBC news report that summer identified Q’s earliest boosters as Mr. Furber (known online as Baruch the Scribe) and three others. The report emphasized that the three others had possible financial motives for stoking the craze because they had solicited donations for Q “research.” (Mr. Furber did not.)

The Swiss team studied writings by those four, as well as by Mr. Watkins and his father, who owns the message board.

In addition to examining those six potential authors, the French scientists added seven more to the mix. They tested tweets by another online Q booster close to the Watkinses as well as by Mr. Trump, his wife, Melania, his son Eric, and three others close to the former president who had publicly encouraged QAnon: Michael T. Flynn, his onetime national security adviser; the political consultant Roger Stone; and Dan Scavino, a Trump White House deputy chief of staff.

Ron Watkins said in a telephone interview, “I am not Q.”Credit...

“At first most of the text is by Furber,” said Mr. Cafiero, who works at the French National Center for Scientific Research. “But the signature of Ron Watkins increased during the first few months as Paul Furber decreased and then dropped completely.”

Mr. Furber said in an interview that he had inherited his passion for American politics from his parents, who had taught in Canada and traveled around the United States. He visited often while building a career in software development and writing for trade publications.

His fascination with conspiracy theories, he said, began with questions about President John F. Kennedy’s assassination. Then, around 1996, he found a site spinning alternative stories about the suicide of Vincent Foster, the Clinton White House counsel, and other deaths said to be connected to the Clintons. “That sort of kicked off my interest,” he said.

The early Q messages, which the scientists say resemble Mr. Furber’s writing, lay out the core QAnon myths and slogans that later messages repeat. That was also when Mr. Furber and a few other early promoters helped attract the interest of entrepreneurial YouTube creators who amplified the messages.

But at the start of 2018, both studies found, the writing changed conspicuously. Where the 2017 posts were filled with Socratic questions, the later posts were more declarative and expository, with heavy use of exclamation points and words written in all capital letters. Sometimes, Q shared internet memes.

The Q messages had recently jumped from an older message board to the one run by Ron Watkins and owned by his father, Jim — the site known then as 8chan and now as 8kun. Jim Watkins, a former U.S. Army helicopter repairman who had settled in the Philippines, also owned pig and honey farms and dabbled in the online pornography business. Around the 2016 election, he had created a conspiracy-minded pro-Trump website, with his son overseeing the technical side.


The evident change in writing style at the start of 2018 coincided with an unusual exchange between the Q account and Ron Watkins. After a period of confusion, whoever was writing as Q publicly asked Mr. Watkins to confirm that the messages were still coming from the original Q. Mr. Watkins immediately did, and then Q declared all future posts would appear exclusively on Mr. Watkins’s platform.

Mr. Furber began complaining that Q had been “hijacked” and that Mr. Watkins was complicit.

From then on, the scientists said, the messages very closely matched the writing of Ron Watkins alone. “When QAnon started to be successful, one of them took control,” said Mr. Roten of OrphAnalytics.

In a podcast interview in 2020, Fredrick Brennan, who started the message board that the Watkinses now own, asserted without proof that Q was the invention of Mr. Furber. An HBO documentary released last year, “Q: Into the Storm,” built a case that Ron Watkins was behind the messages, and in it Mr. Watkins briefly seemed to admit that he had written as Q. He then smiled, laughed and resumed his denials.


A QAnon rally in 2019. Adherents of the movement may number in the millions, some polls indicate.Credit...Tom Brenner for The New York Times

Q has now gone silent, without posting a message since December 2020.

Mr. Furber, in an interview, said he believed that QAnon was “an operation that has run its course.” He said he was still convinced that it was orchestrated by a true insider “to awaken people to this massive secret war against the cabal,” and that “the next phase is coming.”

In an online memoir he posted about the QAnon movement, he writes wistfully about the early days before “the hijacking.” Q’s messages, he says, seemed to validate conspiracy theories he had subscribed to for years — tying the Clintons and George Soros to the Rothschilds and the Illuminati.

“Like a child being taken around his father’s workshop for the first time,” Mr. Furber writes, “we were being given a behind-the-scenes look into the ugly and corrupt world of geopolitics.”


David D. Kirkpatrick is a national correspondent based in New York and the author of “Into the Hands of the Soldiers: Freedom and Chaos in Egypt and the Middle East.“