Wednesday, February 21, 2018

A Celebrity Philosopher Explains the Populist Insurgency

Peter Sloterdijk has spent decades railing against the pieties of liberal democracy. Now his ideas seem prophetic.

By Thomas Meaney The New Yorker

Peter Sloterdijk has emerged as his country’s most controversial public intellectual.Illustration by Mikkel Sommer

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One weekend last June, in an auditorium in the German city of Karlsruhe, the philosopher Peter Sloterdijk celebrated his seventieth birthday by listening to twenty lectures about himself. A cluster of Europe’s leading intellectuals, academics, and artists, along with a smattering of billionaires, were paying tribute to Germany’s most controversial thinker, in the town where he was born and where he recently concluded a two-decade tenure as the rector of the State Academy for Design. There were lectures on Sloterdijk’s thoughts on Europe, democracy, religion, love, war, anger, the family, and space. There were lectures on his commentaries on Shakespeare and Clausewitz, and on his witty diaries, and slides of buildings inspired by his insights. Between sessions, Sloterdijk, who has long, straw-colored hair and a straggly mustache, prowled among luminaries of the various disciplines he has strayed into, like a Frankish king greeting lords of recently subdued fiefdoms. The academy bookstore was selling most of his books—sixty-odd titles produced over the past forty years. The latest, “After God,” was displayed on a pedestal in a glass cube.

At a dinner in his honor, Sloterdijk surveyed the scene with a Dutch friend, Babs van den Bergh. “Do you think I should read out the letter?” he asked. In his hand was a note from Chancellor Angela Merkel praising his contributions to German culture.

“You really shouldn’t read it,” van den Bergh said.
“It’s not even a good letter, is it?” Sloterdijk said. “It’s so short. She probably didn’t even write it.”

“Of course she didn’t write it,” van den Bergh said. “But you would never get a letter like that in the Netherlands or anywhere else. Someone in her office worked very hard on it.”

Reverence for intellectual culture is waning in much of the world, but it remains strong in Germany. Sloterdijk’s books vie with soccer-star memoirs on the German best-seller lists. A late-night TV talk show that he co-hosted, “The Philosophical Quartet,” ran for a decade. He has written an opera libretto, published a bawdy epistolary novel lampooning the foundation that funds the country’s scientific research, and advised some of Europe’s leading politicians.
Sloterdijk’s colleagues offered encomiums. The architect Daniel Libeskind said that his books have inspired a rethinking of European public space. Bruno Latour, the sociologist and historian of science, apologized for not knowing German, and recited in French a long, droll poem he had written, describing Sloterdijk as a scribe of God. There was a video montage of Sloterdijk’s television appearances across the decades, in which a young blond mystic with arctic-blue eyes and torn sweaters gradually morphed into the burgherly figure before us.

On the second night of the symposium, Sloterdijk and his partner, the journalist Beatrice Schmidt, invited some friends to their apartment, on a stately street next door to a Buddhist meditation center. A picture by Anselm Kiefer of a bomber plane hung in the hallway to the kitchen. In the building’s untamed back garden, Sloterdijk began pouring bottles of white Rhône wine for his guests. There were whispers about the wonders of his cellar. On a small wooden porch, Sloterdijk spoke to two young women about his recent travails while getting his driver’s license renewed. “It’s a complete horror,” he said. “It takes nine hours in Germany. Only your most maniacally loyal friends are willing to go with you.” When Sloterdijk goes into one of his conversational riffs, there is a feeling of liftoff. A rhythmic nasal hum develops momentum and eventually breaks into more ethereal climes, creating the sense that you have cleared the quotidian. “The car is like a uterus on wheels,” he says. “It has the advantage over its biological model for being linked to independent movement and a feeling of autonomy. The car also has phallic and anal components—the primitive-aggressive competitive behavior, and the revving up and overtaking which turns the other, slower person into an expelled turd.”

In Germany, where academic philosophers still equate dryness with seriousness, Sloterdijk has a near-monopoly on irreverence. This is an important element of his wide appeal, as is his eagerness to offer an opinion on absolutely anything—from psychoanalysis to finance, Islam to Soviet modernism, the ozone layer to Neanderthal sexuality. An essay on anger can suddenly plunge into a history of smiling; a meditation on America may veer into a history of frivolity. His magnum opus, the “Spheres” trilogy, nearly three thousand pages long, includes a rhapsodic excursus on rituals of human-placenta disposal. He is almost farcically productive. As his editor told me, “The problem with Sloterdijk is that you are always eight thousand pages behind.”

This profligacy makes Sloterdijk hard to pin down. He is known not for a single grand thesis but for a shrapnel-burst of impressionistic coinages—“anthropotechnics,” “negative gynecology,” “co-immunism”—that occasionally suggest the lurking presence of some larger system. Yet his prominence as a public intellectual comes from a career-long rebellion against the pieties of liberal democracy, which, now that liberal democracy is in crisis worldwide, seems prophetic. A signature theme of his work is the persistence of ancient urges in supposedly advanced societies. In 2006, he published a book arguing that the contemporary revolt against globalization can be seen as a misguided expression of “noble” sentiments, which, rather than being curbed, should be redirected in ways that left-liberals cannot imagine. He has described the Presidential race between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump as a choice “between two helplessly gesticulating models of normality, one of which appeared to be delegitimatized, the other unproven,” and is unsurprised that so many people preferred the latter. Few philosophers are as fixated on the current moment or as gleefully ready to explain it.

Sloterdijk’s comfort with social rupture has made him a contentious figure in Germany, where stability, prosperity, and a robust welfare state are seen as central to the country’s postwar achievement. Many Germans define themselves by their moral rectitude, as exhibited by their reckoning with the Nazi past and, more recently, by the government’s decision to accept more refugees from the Syrian civil war than any other Western country. Sloterdijk is determined to disabuse his countrymen of their polite illusions. He calls Germany a “lethargocracy” and the welfare state a “fiscal kleptocracy.” He has decried Merkel’s attitude toward refugees, drawn on right-wing thinkers such as Martin Heidegger and Arnold Gehlen, and even speculated about genetic enhancement of the human race. As a result, some progressives refuse to utter his name in public. In 2016, the head of one centrist party denounced him as a stooge for the AfD, a new far-right party that won thirteen per cent of the vote in last year’s federal elections.

The rise of the German right has made life more complicated for Sloterdijk. Positions that, at another time, might have been forgiven as attempts to stir debate now appear dangerous. A decade ago, Sloterdijk predicted a nativist resurgence in Europe, a time when “we will look back nostalgically to the days when we considered a dashing populist showman like Jörg Haider”—the late Austrian far-right leader—“a menace.” Now Sloterdijk has found himself in the predicament of a thinker whose reality has caught up with his pronouncements.

The rest of Germany thinks of Karlsruhe, when it thinks of it at all, as a placid city where the Supreme Court is situated. Nestled in the far southwest, where Germany begins to blend into France, Karlsruhe was one of the first planned cities of Europe and an oasis of the Enlightenment. When Thomas Jefferson passed through, in 1788, he sent a sketch of the street plan back home, as a possible template for the layout of Washington, D.C.

The town is also the birthplace of the inventor of the bicycle, an entrepreneurial baron named Karl von Drais—a fact that Sloterdijk, who loves cycling, cherishes. When I met him a few weeks after his birthday celebrations, he suggested riding into town to try a new steak restaurant. He talked about advances in bicycle design, which got him onto one of his favorite topics: inventors. “There are people who are all around us who have invented something essential,” he said. “There’s a man in Germany who invented the retractable dog leash. Can you imagine? Millions of people have them now. Of course, these leashes present an existential threat to me, since I’m an avid cyclist. Sometimes I’m riding fast and there’s an owner over there, and the dog over there, and in between—!”

We embarked. On his bike, Sloterdijk seemed massive. In the light wind, his plaid short-sleeved shirt became a billowing tube. The fusion of man and machine looked top-heavy and precarious, but his pedalling was strikingly efficient, unstrenuous yet powerful. From the chest up, he appeared no different from the way he does in a seminar room.

At the restaurant, Sloterdijk ordered a glass of rosé. I asked him about the German federal elections, which were a few months away. Sloterdijk spoke disparagingly of all the major parties, except for the F.D.P., Germany’s closest equivalent to libertarians. “The most appealing scenario would be for the F.D.P. to share a coalition with Merkel’s Christian Democrats,” he said. “They could inject some sense into them.”

Most Germans think of health care, education, and other basic services as rights, not privileges, but the F.D.P. has argued that the country’s welfare state has become hypertrophied, a view close to Sloterdijk’s own. “It creates a double current of resentment,” he said. “You have the people making money who feel no gratitude in return for all they give in taxes. Then you have the people who receive the money. They also feel resentment. They would like to trade places with the rich who give to them. So both sides feel bitterly betrayed and angry.” Sloterdijk argues that taxation should be replaced with a system in which the richest members voluntarily fund great civic and artistic works. He believes that this kind of social web of happy givers and receivers existed until around the end of the Renaissance but was then obliterated by the rise of the European state. He gets excited about the profusion of philanthropic schemes emanating from Silicon Valley and sees in them an attractive model for the future.

Compared with many other countries in the West, Germany still has a relatively high level of social equality. The Second World War decimated the German aristocracy, and anti-élitist sentiment surged during the protests of 1968, as a generation of German students began to question the bourgeois priorities of their parents. There is a widespread skepticism of unbridled American-style capitalism and consumer culture. German bankers earn a fraction of what their American counterparts do, and avoid ostentation. It is not uncommon for C.E.O.s and C.F.O.s to painstakingly sort through their household recycling on the weekends. People are wary of credit—nearly eighty per cent of German transactions are made in cash—and customers in hardware shops and bakeries pay, with unfathomable diligence, in exact change.

But even in Germany inequality is growing. Sharp hikes in apartment-rental prices in major cities have dissolved neighborhoods and pushed ordinary workers into long commutes. Last year, the government put forward a plan to privatize the Autobahn. Deutsche Bank, once a stolid provincial lender, has transformed itself in the past two decades into a steroidal, Wall Street-style multinational, a leader in the collateralization of debt, and a major creditor of Donald Trump. Hippie beach enclaves on the Baltic Sea have become resorts for trust-funders.

Germany’s embrace of luxury delights Sloterdijk. He believes that it was a historic mistake of the international left to “declare war on the beautiful people,” and welcomes signs that Germans are allowing themselves to take pleasure in extravagance. The proliferation of sleek steak restaurants, such as the one we were in, is but one promising sign among many.

The waiter stopped by our table, and Sloterdijk handed him back his second glass of wine. “Was it not cold?” the waiter asked. “Yes, but I want it colder,” Sloterdijk said. Later, as we got up to leave, the waiter tentatively approached him and asked, “Are you Herr Sloterdijk?” For a second, it seemed as if he was going to kiss his hand.

As we rode our bikes through Karlsruhe, I asked Sloterdijk what he remembered of his childhood. “We lived in another part of town,” he said over his shoulder. “I’ve gone back to visit it, looking for traces, but nothing came back: there was no temps retrouvé! ” Sloterdijk was born in 1947, part of the generation that Germans call “rubble children”; he remembers playing in the ruins left behind by the Allied bombing campaigns. His mother worked at a radar center during the war, and met his father, a Dutch sailor, after the German collapse. The marriage did not last long, and Sloterdijk lost contact with his father in early youth. “I had to find my own father and mentors, which meant that I had to look in the world around me,” he has said. “Somehow I managed to divide myself into teacher and student.”

Part of the “somehow” involved his mother, who taught him ancient Greek sayings and harbored no doubts about her son’s genius. When Sloterdijk was a teen-ager, they moved to Munich, where, outside school, he started consuming large amounts of expressionist poetry. In the late nineteen-sixties, he studied literature and philosophy as an undergraduate at the University of Munich, where his friend Rachel Salamander, now an editor and the owner of a Jewish-literature bookshop in the city, remembers him as a dazzling presence. “He spoke faster than everyone thought, and wrote faster than they spoke,” she told me. “I was not surprised at all by what he became.”

Sloterdijk pursued a doctorate at the University of Hamburg but received only a middling grade on his dissertation, and, for a while, his academic prospects were uncertain. In 1979, he moved to India, where he studied with the guru Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, near Pune. He says that the greatest discussions of Adorno he ever heard were on the fringes of an ashram there. His time in India led him to challenge many of his intellectual assumptions. “In the German philosophical tradition, we were told that we humans were poor devils,” he said to me. “But in India the message was: we weren’t poor devils, we contained hidden gods!”

In 1983, a few years after his return, Sloterdijk published a thousand-page book that has sold more copies than any other postwar book of German philosophy. The title, “The Critique of Cynical Reason,” seemed to promise a cheeky update of Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason,” but the book instead delivered a wildly personal polemic about the deterioration of the utopian spirit of 1968 and called for Sloterdijk’s generation to take stock of itself. His peers, as they reached middle age, were pragmatically adjusting to global capitalism and to the nuclear stalemate of the Cold War. He issued a challenge to readers to scour history and art for ways of overcoming social atomization. Punning on Kant’s concept of the thing-in-itself, he asked, “Have we not become the isolated thing-for-yourself in the middle of similar beings?”

The antidote to cynicism, he suggested, was a re-immersion in the heritage of the Cynics of ancient Greece. He looked to the philosopher Diogenes, who rejected the social conventions that governed human behavior and said that people should live instinctively, like dogs. The word “cynic” comes from the Greek kynikos, meaning “doglike,” and Sloterdijk coined the term “kynicism” to differentiate Diogenes’ active assault on prevailing norms from the passive disengagement of the late twentieth century. He celebrated the direct way that Diogenes made his points—masturbating in the marketplace, defecating in the theatre—and suggested that the answer to his generation’s malaise was to repurpose the spontaneous currents of sixties counterculture.

The book caught a moment and made philosophy seem both relevant and fun, beguiling readers with arguments about the philosophical import of breasts and farts. But although it made Sloterdijk’s name, he remained an academic outsider, drifting from post to post for almost a decade. His response was to dismiss those who dismissed him—“Their codes and rituals are reliably antithetical to thought,” he told me—and to forge his reputation instead with articles in magazines and newspapers. He received job offers from America, but it was becoming clear that he was by nature a gadfly—that he and Germany needed each other because they agitated each other so much.

Sloterdijk began picking fights with some of the most renowned members of the German academic establishment, in particular the leftist theorists of the Frankfurt School. “It’s not advisable to go up against Sloterdijk in a public setting,” Axel Honneth, a leading figure of the school, told me. “He wins on points of rhetoric that are in inverse proportion to the irresponsibility of his ideas.” A French-Canadian academic recently produced a diagram of Sloterdijk’s feuds with other German intellectuals; it looks like a trick play in football.

The most notorious episode occurred in 1999, after Sloterdijk published “Rules for the Human Zoo,” an essay about the fate of humanism. Since Roman times, he argued, humanism’s latent message had been that “reading the right books calms the inner beast” and its function was to select a “secret élite” of the literate. Now, in the age of media-saturated mass culture, reading great books had lost its selective function. “What can tame man, when the role of humanism as the school for humanity has collapsed?” he wrote. Channelling Heidegger and Nietzsche, Sloterdijk imagined an “Über-humanist” who might use “genetic reform” to insure “that an élite is reared with certain characteristics.”

In Germany, where the very word “selection” is enough to set off alarms, Sloterdijk’s essay invited antagonism. Was he making a plea for eugenics? Jürgen Habermas, the country’s most revered philosopher, declared that Sloterdijk’s work had “fascist implications,” and encouraged other writers to attack him. Sloterdijk responded by proclaiming the death of the Frankfurt School, to which Habermas belongs, writing that “the days of hyper-moral sons of national-socialist fathers are coming to an end.” German intellectuals mostly sided with Habermas, but Sloterdijk emerged from the scuffle with his status considerably enhanced. He was now a national figure who stood for everything that Habermas did not.

Sloterdijk’s professional uncertainties resolved themselves in the early nineties, when his appointment to a prime post at the academy in Karlsruhe gave him the freedom to do whatever he liked. Since then, his newspaper articles and TV appearances have gradually established him as a media celebrity. Over the summer, ordinary Germans who spotted his books in my hands engaged me in conversation on trains, in coffee shops, at universities, and in bookshops. “Sloterdijk creates for his readers the feeling that they are suddenly in possession of the solutions to the greatest problems in philosophy,” the German literary critic Gustav Seibt told me. He also has a strong following among wealthy élites, who value the intellectual patina he provides for their world views. Nicolas Berggruen, a billionaire investor who recently established an annual million-dollar philosophy prize, told me, “Sloterdijk takes on the biggest issues, but in the least conventional ways.”

In the academy, he is still regarded with suspicion. The English philosopher John Gray argued, in a recent issue of The New York Review of Books, that, sentence by sentence, much of his output is simply incomprehensible. It’s a common reaction among Anglophone readers, who are often baffled by the scale of his reputation. This is in part because his metaphorical, image-addicted style of philosophy has been in short supply in English since Coleridge. But in Europe it finds a ready audience. His writings, abstruse yet popularizing, have made him an uplifting guru for some and a convenient devil for others—the crucial fact being that he is never ignored. “The most interesting thing about Sloterdijk may not be anything particular he has written,” the Berkeley intellectual historian Martin Jay told me, “but simply the fact that he exists.”

Shortly after the German federal elections in September, I met Sloterdijk for lunch, at a small Italian restaurant in the west of Berlin. “This is a restaurant where Gerhard Schröder used to come,” Sloterdijk told me with satisfaction. The former German Chancellor began inviting Sloterdijk to gatherings of intellectuals in the nineties, when his broadsides against left-leaning public moralists were first winning him a following among conservative and centrist politicians. After our lunch, Sloterdijk was going to see the country’s current President, Frank-Walter Steinmeier. I asked if he ever saw Angela Merkel, and he laughed, saying, “She’s got to this point where she exudes the persona of a woman who no longer needs anyone’s advice.”

Since I had last seen Sloterdijk, Merkel and her party, the C.D.U., had pulled off a narrow victory in the federal elections, but major gains achieved by previously marginal parties were making it hard for Merkel to assemble a governing coalition. The leftist party Die Linke had made inroads into the youth vote, recalling the successes of Bernie Sanders and Jeremy Corbyn. The libertarian F.D.P., which Sloterdijk had praised months before, had done well, too, but eventually turned down the opportunity to join Merkel in a coalition government. Overshadowing everything else in the headlines were the advances made by the nationalist AfD.

When I brought up the AfD, Sloterdijk sank his head in his hands, and his expansive manner gave way to something more cautious. For years, the German media have been making connections between Sloterdijk’s thought and new right-wing groups, and he’s become used to rebutting the charge of harboring far-right sympathies. In my conversations with him, his political preoccupations seemed closer to libertarianism than to anything more blood and soil, but he has a habit of saying things that, depending on your view, seem either like dog whistles to the far right or like the bomb-throwing reflexes of a born controversialist. When Sloterdijk said, of Merkel’s refugee policy, that “no society has the moral obligation to self-destruct,” his words called to mind Thilo Sarrazin, a former board member of the Bundesbank, who, in 2010, published an anti-Muslim tract with the title “Germany Abolishes Itself,” which became a huge best-seller and made racial purity a respectable concern of national discussion.

I asked Sloterdijk about Marc Jongen, a former doctoral student of his who became the AfD’s “party philosopher” and recently took up a seat in the Bundestag. “In a perfect world, you are not responsible for your students,” he said. “But we live in a half-perfect world, and so now people try to pin Jongen to me.” I asked if there was any common ground between him and Jongen, and he replied with an emphatic no, calling Jongen “a complete impostor.” He went on, “He came to the university to study Sanskrit classics like the Upanishads, but then he gave it all up. A political career is the way out for him.” The response was unequivocal, but couched less in terms of moral abhorrence than of professional disdain.

Sloterdijk deplored the rise of the right, but he couldn’t resist seeing something salutary in the spectacle. “It’s been coming for a long time,” he said. “It’s also a sign that Germans are more like the rest of humanity than they like to believe.” He started talking about “rage banks,” his term for the way that disparate grievances can be organized into larger reserves of political capital.

He described this concept in his 2006 book “Rage and Time,” an examination of the loathing of liberal democracy by nativist, populist, anarchic, and terrorist movements. The book follows his usual detour-giddy historical method, comparing political uses of anger, and of related emotions such as pride and resentment, from Homer to the present. In premodern societies, he argues, vengeance and blood feuds provided ample outlet for these impulses. Later, loyalty to the nation-state performed a similar function, and international Communism managed to direct class rage into utopian projects. But modern capitalism presents a particular problem. “Ever more irritated and isolated individuals find themselves surrounded by impossible offers,” he writes, and, out of this frustrated desire, “an impulse to hate everything emerges.” It was this kind of rage, Sloterdijk believes, that was on display in the riots in the banlieues of Paris in 2005.

In “Rage and Time,” Sloterdijk writes that the discontents of capitalism leave societies susceptible to “rage entrepreneurs”—a phrase that uncannily foreshadows the advent of Donald Trump. When we spoke about Trump, Sloterdijk explained him as part of a shift in Western history. “This is a moment that won’t come again,” he told me. “Both of the old Anglophone empires have within a short period withdrawn from the universal perspective.” Sloterdijk went so far as to claim that Trump uses fears of ecological devastation in his favor. “The moment for me was when I first heard him say ‘America First,’ ” he said. “That means: America to the front of the line! But it’s not the line for globalization anymore, but the line for resources. Trump channels this global feeling of ecological doom.”

I asked Sloterdijk if there was something specifically American about Trumpism. “You can’t go looking for Trump in Europe,” he told me. “You know, Hegel in his time was convinced that the state in the form of the rule of law had not yet arrived in the new world. He thought that the individual—private, virtuous—had to anticipate the state. You see this in American Westerns, where the good sheriff has to imagine the not-yet-existent state in his own private morality. But Trump is a degenerate sheriff. He acts as if he doesn’t care if the state comes into being or not, and mocks the upright townsfolk. What makes Trump dangerous is that he exposes parts of liberal democracies that were only shadowily visible up until now. In democracies, there is always an oligarchic element, but Trump makes it extremely, comically visible.” For Sloterdijk, Trump’s true significance lies in the way that he instinctively subverts the norms of modern governance. “He’s an innovator when it comes to fear,” Sloterdijk told me. “Instead of waiting for the crisis to impose his decree, his decrees get him the emergencies he needs. The playground for madness is vast.”

The day after our lunch was the five-hundredth anniversary of the beginning of the Reformation. The city of Wittenberg, half an hour outside Berlin, where Luther had—allegedly—nailed his Ninety-five Theses to the door of the Castle Church, had suddenly been transformed into something like an American Christian-college campus. Midwesterners and Californians mixed with fellow-pilgrims in squares and outside churches, discussing the doings of St. Paul and debating whether Luther was a monk or a friar. Faux-medieval stalls were selling Reformation souvenirs, including T-shirts that said “Viva la Reformation!” and Luther socks that read “Here I stand, I can do no other.”

Sloterdijk had come to speak at a local Protestant academy about the meaning of the Reformation. “Luther had the great fortune to be followed by Bach,” Sloterdijk told his audience. “His form of individualism was illuminated by the most beautiful music.”

“But he was also followed by Hitler!” a young man in the audience said.
“Hitler was a degraded Papist,” Sloterdijk shot back.

Little by little, the discussion gravitated to assaults on Sloterdijk’s positions. “You sound like the right-wingers when you speak of the refugees,” an elderly doctor stood up and declared. “We cared about refugees after the war and we can do it again.”

Sloterdijk replied impatiently. “The Americans gave us this idea of multiculturalism that suited their society fine, but which, as software, is not compatible with our German hardware of the welfare state,” he said. “There’s this family metaphor spreading everywhere: the idea that all of humanity is our family. That idea helped destroy the Roman Empire. Now we’re in danger of letting that metaphor get out of control all over again. People are not ready to feel the full pressure of coexistence with billions of their contemporaries.” He went on, “In the past, geography created discretionary boundaries between nations and cultures. Distances that were difficult to overcome allowed for mental and political space.” Space and distance, he argued, had allowed for a kind of liberality and generosity that was now under siege—by refugees, by social media, by everything.

At the end of the talk, the faithful of all ages lined up to buy copies of “After God.” The polite chatter momentarily gave way to the brisk ritual of book-signing. Sloterdijk scrawled on the open books offered to him. Bearing a freshly signed copy, a pastor visiting from the Rhineland sympathized with Sloterdijk’s predicament as a salesman. “We become more like America every day,” he told him. “Isn’t it a pity?” ♦

This article appears in the print edition of the February 26, 2018, issue, with the headline “Doktor Zeitgeist.”

Thomas Meaney, a writer and a historian, is working on a book about American thinkers and decolonization.

Monday, January 22, 2018

Anti-Immigrant Racism

Trump’s Anti-Immigrant Racism Represents an American Tradition
By PAUL A. KRAMER New York Times

President Trump has inspired widespread outrage and disgust with his crude, racist disparagement of Haiti, El Salvador and African nations and the predominantly black and brown immigrants from these places.

As horrifying as this remark was, his groundbreaking transparency provides an opportunity. Racism has long fueled United States immigration exclusions and restrictions, but these days it’s rare to hear rhetoric that openly reflects this reality, providing us a chance to delve into its roots and implications.

We’ve grown accustomed to the dog-whistling of anti-immigrant racism. Where blood, purity and civilization were once its everyday vocabulary, anti-racist and immigrant rights activism have, at least until recently, succeeded in forcing such talk underground. Our era’s seemingly race-neutral languages of security, legality, culture, productivity and assimilation are often strongly inflected with racial meanings, but they’re subtler and deniable, attracting far less opposition than, say, likening countries to outhouses.

Public utterances like Mr. Trump’s have and should inspire outrage, but we need to go deeper, challenging the racist views — both flagrant and soft-pedaled — that have long shaped America’s immigration policy. And we need to ask hard questions about the ways racism has decisively, durably shaped the immigration debate in ways that usually go unnoticed.

The truth is, many of the United States’ early policies toward immigrants were conceived in recognizably Trumpian terms, in substance if not in tenor. The president’s headline-making sentiment that people from countries like Norway (read: white people) were preferable would have been recognizable to the founders.

The nation’s first naturalization law, from 1790, closed off United States citizenship to all but “free white persons of good character.” People of African descent were among the first migrants singled out for surveillance and exclusion, as they sought entry to the country or moved between states. State repression of black migrants transformed them into America’s first “illegal immigrants,” laying the groundwork for durable associations between law, morality and the need to keep people of color, quite literally, in their “place.”

The racialization of United States immigration law took off in the decades following the Civil War. Beginning with the Chinese, migrants from Asia were the early targets; beginning in 1917, an “Asiatic Barred Zone” (with latitude and longitude markers laid out clearly in the legislative code) kept out migrants from an imaginary mega-region that stretched from contemporary Turkey to Papua New Guinea.

In the aftermath of World War I, a new “national origins” quota system sought to turn back the American demographic clock, with European immigrants admitted in proportion to the presence of their “nationality” in the American population based on earlier censuses. It was “Make America Great Again” for a eugenic age. Hitler was a fan. America appeared to be “a young, racially select people,” he wrote admiringly in 1928, by “making an immigrant’s ability to set foot on American soil dependent on specific racial requirements,” among other factors.

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The United States’ unapologetically racist immigration codes — with Asian exclusion and “national origins” at their core — survived the Great Depression, World War II, and the beginnings of the Cold War and decolonization; the presumption that the United States was or should be a white fortress in a mostly colored world was backstopped by science, religion, scholarship and popular culture. American law did not allow Asians to obtain citizenship until 1952.

Under the pressure of anti-racist and immigrant rights pressure, the system fell in 1965 with the passage of the Hart-Celler Act, which foregrounded family reunification, refugee admissions and the entry of the highly skilled and educated. But racism persisted in both policy enforcement and popular attitudes.

New caps on Western Hemisphere migration — flying in the face of United States demand for workers, an entrenched labor migration industry and poverty and repression in Latin America that forced thousands into exile — outlawed decades-old migration flows. In the 1990s new nativist movements directed against Latin Americans arose, as well as efforts to eliminate migrants’ rights to basic services and the expansion of immigrant incarceration and mass deportation. In the aftermath of Sept. 11, the principle that immigrants from Muslim-majority countries required special scrutiny and restriction was central to the remaking of immigration policy in the name of national security.

The prevailing questions we’re conditioned to ask about immigrants have all been deeply shaped by histories of racial restriction. Can “we” assimilate and civilize “them”? Will “they” — despite their negative features and the risks they pose — make “us” wealthier and more powerful? Will “they” sap “our” resources?

This past week, liberals, progressives and others protesting Mr. Trump’s comments about Haiti, El Salvador, and the countries of Africa understandably rushed to defend them as beautiful, dignified places unworthy of his vulgar derision. But in this defensive posture of response, which inadvertently legitimates the questions it answers, one can also feel the overwhelming presence of racist suspicion and hostility roaring out of the past into our time.

We will not, ultimately, succeed in deposing Mr. Trump’s hateful, racist approach toward immigrants unless we refuse not only his nastiest word choices, but also the underlying questions he and others insist we ask.

We can choose to ask different questions: To what extent are the countries of the global north implicated in forces that prevent people in the global south from surviving and thriving where they are? In what ways do restrictive immigration policies heighten the exploitation of workers? How does the fear of deportation make migrant workers easier to discipline, hurt and rob? In what ways does mass migration from the poorer parts of the earth to centers of wealth and power reflect the larger problem of global inequality?

Elites in the United States and elsewhere — long before Donald Trump’s presidency — have long known they could sustain their power by capitalizing on, deepening and, where necessary, inventing divisions between self and other, friend and enemy. This political strategy, with troubling successes to its name, has been updated and rescaled for our globalized age, in which the fault lines are those of bordered nationality: There will be no protection offered from polluters or health insurance companies, but the threat of Muslims and Mexicans will be met.

To the white nationalists’ war cry against migrants, “You will not replace us,” we can and should reply, as have many before, “You will not divide us.”

Paul A. Kramer is an associate professor of history at Vanderbilt University and the author of “The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines.”

Wednesday, January 03, 2018

What Happens When You Go Under
By HENRY MARSHJAN. 3, 2018

ANESTHESIA 
The Gift of Oblivion and the Mystery of Consciousness 
By Kate Cole-Adams 
400 pp. Counterpoint. $28.

A Doctor’s Notes on Anesthesia 
By Henry Jay Przybylo 
240 pp. W.W. Norton & Company. $25.95.

A few years ago I suffered a retinal detachment that required fairly urgent surgical treatment. The surgeon came to see me on the morning of the operation and said that I could choose between local and general anesthesia. The thought of having three large needles stuck into my eyeball, and the vitreous humor then being sucked out while I was awake, did not appeal. I thought of the lines from “King Lear,” spoken by Cornwall as he cuts out Gloucester’s eyes: “Out, vile jelly!” To my surgeon’s obvious relief I opted for a general anesthetic — it is much less stressful to operate on unconscious than conscious patients, especially if they are your professional colleagues. There was a certain irony to this as my neurosurgical practice largely involved removing brain tumors from my own patients while they were awake, under local anesthetic.

At this point an anesthesiologist burst into the room — he must have been listening at the keyhole, awaiting my decision. He rapidly assessed my fitness for anesthesia and 30 minutes later he was putting a needle into the back of my hand and injecting the drug propofol. I was asleep, as doctors say — although the state of being anesthetized has nothing in common with sleep — within a matter of seconds.

Anesthesiologists (anesthetists in the British idiom) are the unsung heroes and heroines of modern medicine. It would be impossible without them. Their duty is to keep us unconscious and pain free, while the more conspicuously heroic surgeons do their work. Patients, therefore, see very little of them and probably do not realize that during surgery their lives depend much more on the skills of the anesthesiologist than on the surgeon’s.

As the anesthesiologist Henry Jay Przybylo explains in “Counting Backwards,” the word “anesthesia” means “without feeling,” but a modern general anesthetic is about much more than just rendering a patient unconscious. It also involves analgesia, the prevention of pain; anxiolysis, the relief of anxiety; and amnesia, the obliteration of memory. The latter is necessary because it is by no means certain that patients are fully unconscious when anesthetized — a problem explored at length in Kate Cole-Adams’s book “Anesthesia.

the central role that anesthetic drugs play in medicine, very little about how they work is known for certain. Equally remarkable is the fact that ether, the first agent to be used as a general anesthetic, was shown by Paracelsus in the 16th century to put chickens to sleep. He wrote that it “quiets all suffering without any harm and relieves all pain…” It remains mysterious as to why 300 years were to pass before it came to be used as a general anesthetic. Some would point to Kuhn’s scientific paradigms and argue that medicine wasn’t ready for such a shift in thinking, others that it reflects the entirely unscientific nature of premodern medicine and the blinkered self-confidence of doctors. There are, of course, many similar examples in the history of medicine — perhaps the most egregious being the failure of the medical profession to exploit Leeuwenhoek’s invention in the 17th century of the microscope and his discovery of microbial life, as discussed in David Wootton’s book “Bad Medicine.”

Several American doctors began to use ether as a general anesthetic in the 1840s. There were bitter disputes about who could claim to be the first, but what is clear is that ether was rapidly taken up by the medical profession. It is interesting to note that it was also widely used as a recreational drug in countries like Ireland and Poland, where it was used as an alternative to alcohol.

Ether is no longer used in general anesthesia, and has been replaced by different “volatile” agents — such as sevoflurane and isoflurane. The way in which these volatile anesthetic agents dissolve in oil led to the theory that they worked by interfering with the lipoprotein membranes of nerve cells, implying that all the brain’s neurons were inactivated by the drugs and that the unconsciousness of general anesthesia was complete. This theory is no longer believed and instead there is near-complete uncertainty as to how the agents do work. More recent research on injectable anesthetic drugs like propofol suggests that they interfere selectively with certain neurotransmitters and with the interaction between the cerebral cortex (where thought and perception resides) and the deep part of the cerebral hemispheres known as the thalamus, which acts as some kind of gateway between the cerebral cortex and the rest of the brain. In other words, it is by no means certain that all of your brain is “asleep” when you are anesthetized.
The possibility of “awareness under anesthesia” is obviously of deep concern to both anesthesiologists and patients and is reminiscent of the fear in previous ages of being buried alive after being mistakenly assumed dead. Awareness became a clinical problem in the 1940s with the introduction of the paralyzing drug curare. Until then, if an anesthetic was inadequate, the patient would start to wake up and to move. With curare this cannot happen and it is possible for patients to be awake and, since they are entirely paralyzed, for the anesthesiologist to be unaware of it.

Awareness undoubtedly can occur under anesthesia although there is much argument as to how often. A 2014 survey in the United Kingdom of three million cases of anesthesia suggested an incidence of 1 in 19,000 with not all the episodes causing distress. This survey relied on patients volunteering their memory of being aware, so it is possible that some chose not to report the experience and that the true incidence might be higher. The issue is further complicated by the possibility of implicit or “unconscious” memory as opposed to conscious or “explicit” memory. The “explicit” memories would be the horror stories of patients wide-awake but unable to move while being operated on, usually as a result of medical error. It seems that the paralysis is even more distressing than the pain and can lead to long-term psychiatric harm and PTSD. Implicit, unconscious memories of being awake under anesthesia are much harder to uncover.

Cole-Adams makes much of these sorts of hidden memories in her book, and of various experiments with hypnotizing patients before and after anesthesia to find them, but as she admits, the evidence is confused and contradictory. Nevertheless, some anesthesiologists are careful in what they say in front of anesthetized patients in case the patient is able to later recall what they overheard. This is quite unlike surgeons who, on the whole, are disinhibited extroverts when operating.

A good experience of anesthesia should be as routine and dull as a commercial airplane ride, with the added feature that the patient should have no memory of it. Both anesthesia and flight have become dramatically safer in recent decades and there is much in common between flying an aircraft and anesthetizing a patient — uneventful most of the time but occasionally terrifying and very occasionally fatal. The Patient Safety movement of recent years has been largely driven by anesthesiologists and analogies to aviation safety, which perhaps apply less well to surgery.

It is difficult to write an exciting book about modern anesthesia but Przybylo is thoughtful and workmanlike in his production, as he is, it is quite clear, when administering his anesthetics. Consciousness is an entirely subjective phenomenon and, perhaps inevitably given its subtitle, you will learn as much, if not more, about Cole-Adams’s own anxieties and preoccupations as you will about anesthesia in her book. The effect, as she streams her consciousness over many pages, can in itself be somewhat anesthetic.

Henry Marsh is the author, most recently, of “Admissions: Life as a Brain Surgeon.”



A version of this review appears in print on January 7, 2018, on Page BR19 of the Sunday Book Review with the headline: You’re Getting Sleepy.

Sunday, December 31, 2017

Sunday, December 24, 2017

The Truck Gene

By PERRI KLASS, M.D. NY TIMES
My younger son, I used to say, had the truck gene.

I still bring this up sometimes when I talk about the importance of reading aloud to small children, because we had assembled, when my son was 2 or 3, one of the world’s largest collections of truck picture books, a failed parental strategy to diversify our reading-aloud assignments. We had to read the favorites (for example, “Bernie Drives a Truck,” a 1992 work by Derek Radford) over and over and over.

Even today, I look at “The Truck Book” (1978, Harry McNaught) with instant recognition — amazingly, it’s still on the current Amazon list of best-selling children’s car and truck books.

We hadn’t particularly tried to develop this child’s interest in trucks, mind you, and we had plenty of books on other subjects, including a massive inheritance from his older brother which skewed toward pirates — but given the choice on any given night, it would be a truck book, and then another truck book, and then, just for variety’s sake, maybe a tractor book or a bulldozer book.

When I mention the truck gene to a group of doctors, a certain number of the mothers and fathers in the room nod knowingly — they’ve been there, and sometimes back.

But even as neuroscience finds new and fascinating ways of looking at the fine points of neural processing and the interconnections of children’s developing brains, that remarkable and somewhat inspirational individual essence remains elusive: Why do you find some particular topic interesting, compelling, memorable, when it leaves me completely unmoved (and, of course, vice versa)?


This is the mystery of personal taste and personal interest, as in, what interests you and what doesn’t, and it is part of what makes us human, and what makes us individual humans. But it’s kind of amazing that it’s present so early, and so powerfully, as children look around the world; that they are capable of being bitten — hard — by some particular bug (and yes, there are kids with the bug gene).

How come you can go into a room full of children, 3 or 4 or 5 years old, and talk to them about dinosaurs, and most of them will be somewhat interested — but one or two will be truly grabbed, truly converted, truly obsessed? They won’t all grow up to be paleontologists, though Stephen Jay Gould wrote in the dedication for “Ever Since Darwin,” his 1977 book of essays on evolution: “For my father, who took me to see the Tyrannosaurus when I was five.”

So sure, some space kids grow up to be astronauts or aerospace engineers, some horse kids grow up to ride, or go to vet school, some bug kids go into entomology. But the point is not that these are necessarily lifelong interests; many have been known to outgrow the pirate stage, and even the horse stage, the bug stage, the dinosaur stage and, thank goodness, the truck stage. The point is that you cannot make a truck kid into a bug kid; they know what’s interesting, though, like the neuroscientists, they may not know why.

And when something interests a small child, all bets are off in terms of memory and vocabulary. The world is full of sweet little voices pronouncing dinosaur names. My own child, and his collection of truck books, enriched my own vocabulary tremendously; I would point at the picture and he would say, for example, “articulated crash rescue vehicle!” (puts out fires at airports, articulated means it has a flexible part in the middle so it can bend as it goes around curves). Lots of syllables there, no helpful little rhymes in the book, and it didn’t matter a bit. Those words were graven on his soul.

Even by age 2 or 3, it’s easy to remember all kinds of stuff, from complex terminology to obscure facts, about the subject that interests you. And that doesn’t go away; when I study for my medical recertification exam, I am still working harder at the topics that interested me less in medical school (how many times have I memorized the kidney?) and still feeling smug about the ones I liked and learned properly the first time around (those fascinating parasitic worms).

Most of us have had occasion to learn as students and as adults, over and over, that you cannot just decide to be interested in something, even if it would do you some personal or professional good. You can bring yourself closer and learn more and try to work up a relationship to the subject, but be it wine or be it nephrology, if it doesn’t grab you, you’re not going to find great pleasure in reading about it, and the details may not stick in your memory.

For the most part, children’s interests and preferences are an occasion for adult appreciation: you may never come to see the magic in trucks, but that just teaches you over and over that your child is a separate person, looking out from a different brain through different eyes.

Of course, some children develop interests that actually veer toward perseveration and obsession, and that children on the autism spectrum may be prone to “highly restricted, fixated interests that are abnormal in intensity or focus.” That is, in fact, one of the possible criteria for an autism spectrum disorder diagnosis in the latest edition of the DSM. (Back when Asperger’s syndrome was recognized, this kind of special interest was thought to be particularly typical of what Dr. Asperger himself called the “little professor syndrome.”)

So we do sometimes worry about a child with a particularly unusual special interest — vacuum cleaners, for example, or string, or about a child whose special interest seems rigid or restrictive, a narrowing down of the child’s world, rather than a special portal into a larger and more fascinating sphere.

But for most typically developing kids, special interests and special subjects are a source of endless bedtime stories, specialized vocabularies, themed birthday parties and Halloween costumes (we put in quite a few pirate years in my house). Above all, when our children develop strong intellectual preferences — and never doubt it, that’s what we’re talking about here — it should bring on that mildly bemused parental headshaking sense that each child is an individual, with a remarkable, fascinating individual brain.

As the mother of a grown child, no longer expressing the truck gene (“Was I really a truck kid?” he emailed me), I want to promise you that you will one day look at these books with smiles and sentiment. And I am willing to bet that no neuroscientific research will actually tease out the individuality of it all, or satisfactorily explain the appeal to those who lack the truck gene, but find that despite our own complete lack of interest, we have managed to memorize “The Truck Book,” not to mention, of course, “Bernie Drives a Truck.”

Friday, November 24, 2017

Hard Time

Two books explore the roots of the criminal-justice crisis

CHASE MADAR

American punitiveness—in our policing, courts, prisons, and law—can’t be fully understood outside the context of white supremacy. Louisiana’s state penitentiary is on the site of a former plantation called Angola, so named because that was where its slaves came from; black men in bondage continue to farm the land. And the incarceration rate for black men in the US is an astronomical 2,207 per 100,000, nearly six times the rate for white men and higher than in South Africa under apartheid. In recent years, videos of lethal police violence against unarmed African Americans have become a constant on TV and online, making the problem virally visible.

Two new books, part of an ongoing bumper crop of necessary writing on criminal justice in the US, explore the relationship between black America and our steroidal punishment system. James Forman Jr. and Paul Butler are both lawyers turned academics who regularly publish in legal journals and the mainstream press. They combine scholarly erudition with a practical knowledge of how the system works, writing with hard-won clarity about prosecutors, judges, defense attorneys, witnesses, victims, and offenders. Approaching the same broad subject, both have produced immensely valuable books written from very different perspectives.

One of Forman’s many talents is his ability to make radical, unsettling points in the calmest of voices. For example, his 2009 article “Exporting Harshness” makes a convincing case that the so-called excesses of the war on terror are not aberrations. They are, he argues, fairly consistent with the norms of the American penal system, and if they have been harder to ignore, that’s because they have occurred in places like Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo Bay, where they have attracted press attention and international outrage. Although journalists have described domestic law-enforcement abuses as the war on terror “coming home” and adopted CIA terms like black site to describe police torture facilities in Chicago, Forman suggests it would make more sense to refer to Abu Ghraib as a Mesopotamian Rikers Island.

In his bracing (but always generous) 2012 critique of Michelle Alexander’s best seller The New Jim Crow (2010), Forman takes on an even more firmly established piece of conventional wisdom. Alexander’s thesis has become dogma among liberal criminal-justice reformers: Namely, mass incarceration is driven by a racist backlash against civil-rights advances, carried out under cover of the war on drugs. Her argument rests in part on the widely held belief that most inmates are nonviolent drug offenders, but Forman points out that only about 25 percent of our prison population fits this description. While it’s undeniable that racism is one of the most powerful engines of our punitive state, Forman asserts that the metaphor of mass incarceration as neo–Jim Crow is limited: “In emphasizing mass incarceration’s racial roots, the New Jim Crow writers overlook other critical factors,” such as the steady rise in violent crime rates from 1960 to the early ’90s and the broad support for disciplinary overkill in overwhelmingly white places like Idaho and Wyoming, which have also seen a steep climb in incarceration rates. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, about 35 percent of the nation’s prisoners were black in 2015. Though that’s an undeniable overrepresentation of black America’s 13 percent share of the overall population, it means the other 65 percent of US prisoners were nonblack. As Forman writes, “That’s a lot of ‘collateral damage.’”

White resentniks like Megyn Kelly and Bill O’Reilly like to accuse black activists and elected officials of being indifferent to violent crime in black neighborhoods, which, like most violent crime, is committed within an ethnic group rather than outside it. But Forman shows that black politicians and community leaders have long been consumed with questions of crime and safety. In Locking Up Our Own, Forman looks at Washington, DC, where he clerked for the US Supreme Court before spending six years as a public defender, and examines how the city came to implement a series of harsh criminal-justice policies beginning in the ’70s. His history lessons scramble standard expectations of politics, Left and Right, black and white. For example, the hiring of more black police officers was once a major civil-rights demand, and one that seemed to make enormous sense. The thinking was—and among many remains—that this would not only give black officers a middle-class footing in decent-paying police jobs but also end the abusive treatment of black citizens. But “ultimately, in practice, these goals were often unrelated,” notes Forman.

He makes the motivations of DC’s black political leaders—people like city-council member Douglas Moore, DC Superior Court judge John Fauntleroy, and the District’s first black US attorney, Eric Holder—perfectly and tragically clear. Analyzing the reformist drive to decriminalize marijuana in the District, which ended in failure in 1975 after months of campaigning, Forman shows that no amount of public-health evidence could convince a critical mass of DC’s black elected officials that cannabis was not a “gateway drug” to addiction and crime. The black civic leaders who opposed decriminalization were not programmatically “conservative” or especially punitive, Forman stresses. Rather, “These leaders regarded themselves as the guardians of the black community, and especially of its young people, whom they were determined to protect from the dangers of drug use.”

This well-meaning notion had disastrous unintended consequences, as did many other measures designed to stop DC’s violent crime wave of the ’70s and ’80s, from increased penalties for firearms possession to the use of “pretextual traffic stops,” a police tactic (supported by Holder) intended to get guns off the street by granting police the power to search pretty much any driver. The result was an upsurge in arrests for mostly petty crimes, especially drug possession, in black neighborhoods. These policies derailed countless lives—their targets lost jobs and incurred the lasting damage of permanent criminal records.

While the book’s main plot arc outlines the tragedy of incrementally escalating punishment, Forman also criticizes today’s liberal reformers for their focus on nonviolent drug crimes, often at the expense of the 53 percent of the nation’s state prisoners who are locked up for violent offenses. Forman recognizes that our punitive state apparatus must be taken apart as it was built—brick by brick—starting with what’s easiest. But if every decarceration measure is washed down with a vilification of people whose violent offenses supposedly make them more deserving of punishment, then “criminal justice reform’s first step—relief for nonviolent drug offenders—could easily become its last.” What then is the appropriate response to a violent offense? Forman answers this difficult question with the story of one of his former clients, a black kid who held up a black middle-aged man at knife point when he was just shy of his sixteenth birthday. Thanks in large part to the author’s own excellent lawyering, the teenager was given a second chance, got plugged into a carpentry program for at-risk youth, and was allowed to unruin his life. The story is a powerful finale to Forman’s book, and it is all the more urgent now, as national urban-homicide rates have increased over the past couple of years: The argument for transforming our abominable justice system should not be predicated on a permanent decline in crime rates.

Throughout Locking Up Our Own, Forman stresses that the embrace of maximum-punishment approaches by DC’s black political class should not let non blacks off the hook. Black elected officials have typically favored an “all-of-the-above strategy” to fighting crime, Forman writes, which includes providing youth services, jobs, and decent health care and housing. But as he makes clear, racism—as well as the white majority’s resentment of non punitive government spending—has played a key role in making expanded police powers and harsher sentences the most readily available options:

From felon disenfranchisement laws that suppress black votes, to exploitative housing practices that strip black wealth, to schools that refuse to educate black children, to win-at-all-costs prosecutors who strike blacks from jury pools, to craven politicians who earn votes by preying on racial anxieties, to the unconscious and implicit biases that infect us all, it is impossible to understand American crime policy without appreciating racism’s enduring role. . . . Racism narrowed the options available to black citizens and elected officials in their fight against crime.

Although Foreman's book is longer on diagnosis than prescription, he does offer some ideas about what’s needed to transform the system: pretrial drug-diversion programs (preferably administered outside the justice system altogether, as they are in Portugal); better funding for public defenders (a rare area in the justice system where the federal government could make a major difference); more judicial discretion and the elimination of mandatory minimums; restoration of voting rights to felons (even while incarcerated); and, for released offenders, employment opportunities and institutional support rather than a life-wrecking stigma. “None of this will be easy,” Forman dryly notes. But his clear-eyed look at the incremental—and never fully intentional—buildup of harsh punishment practices in DC offers hope: Perhaps the system could be consciously transformed, step-by-step, even if it takes a generation or more.

The enduring punishment of black men is also the subject of Chokehold by Paul Butler, another public intellectual with zero time for easy optimism. He is a radical critic of the empty promises of liberal procedural in criminal justice, especially in dealing with ongoing racial disparities. A former federal prosecutor, Butler wrote an essay for the Yale Law Journal in 1995 arguing that black juries should nullify many criminal verdicts against black defendants, which earned him a 60 Minutes segment and landfills’ worth of apoplectic correspondence. The first chapter of his previous book, Let’s Get Free, is an account of how a mentally disturbed neighbor’s false allegations led to his own arrest and prosecution—and eventual acquittal—and highlights the many difficulties that a black man faces, even if he’s a prosecutor himself, when confronted with criminal charges. It is a masterpiece in the literature of American criminal justice.

Chokehold is explicitly intersectional in its focus on black men and their victimization by the criminal-justice system, as both African Americans (disproportionately incarcerated and more likely to get longer sentences than non blacks) and men (punished in greater numbers and more harshly than women). At the same time, Butler is at pains to distinguish his approach from “black male exceptionalism” as well as the rhetoric that “black men are an ‘endangered species,’” which he believes further pathologizes them and mystifies the crisis. His focus on black men comes with a great deal of peripheral vision: He argues, for instance, that programs such as the My Brother’s Keeper initiative launched by President Obama should always be matched by programs to help black women, who by some important measures, like income, are worse off than their male counterparts.

While Forman’s book is a fine-grained historical narrative about one city, with most of its big ideas implicit, Butler engages directly with thinkers and concepts from critical race studies and other social theories, from Derrick Bell to Michel Foucault to Kimberlé Crenshaw. Each chapter presents a sequence of well-honed micro-essays that are typically about seven hundred words long, sometimes progressing in a straight line, sometimes by knight’s moves. He follows his subject to all the disturbing places the evidence takes him: the fact that even white guys with stereotypically “Afrocentric” facial features get harsher sentences; the sexual humiliation of stop-and-frisk pat-downs; the general uselessness of Department of Justice interventions into local police departments; the way a handful of US Supreme Court decisions have granted the police “super powers,” so that our laws now act more as a liability shield for state violence than as a check against it; how even a well-intention “Ban the Box” campaign to eliminate criminal-history questions from job applications has resulted in harm to black men’s employment chances by allowing employers to give free rein to their prejudices.

Butler doesn’t flinch from facts that many reformers prefer to avoid. While it’s true that drug-use rates are broadly similar across racial groups (a key part of Alexander’s New Jim Crow narrative), Butler points out that offending rates for violent crime are higher among black men, even if the vast majority of black men have never been convicted of a violent crime. Skeptical of reformism in general, Butler joins Angela Y. Davis and others in calling for the abolition of the whole punishment apparatus. This is perhaps more prosaic than it sounds. As Butler explains, pursuing an abolitionist agenda does not mean emptying every prison overnight but rather steadily transferring resources away from police and prisons and toward education (e.g., replacing school security guards with guidance counselors), employment, and mental-health care—a similar set of solutions to those proposed by Forman.

Occasionally, Butler’s approach shows the limits of trying to understand American punishment primarily through the lens of racial inequality. For example, he makes the common claim that in contrast to the crack epidemic of the 1980's, the current opioid-abuse crisis—whose victims are predominantly white—is treated as a public-health problem. And while it’s true that, anecdotally, a sprinkling of police precincts have taken steps in this direction (and that policy elites now use more humane rhetoric), we are still light-years away from a public-health approach that doesn’t involve cops and courts. District attorneys across the country are expanding the criminalization of opioids, charging users with felony child neglect and dealers with homicide. And Florida, our third-largest state, just enacted a slew of mandatory-minimum sentence laws in a bill that makes little distinction between run-of-the-mill users and dealers. This bill passed despite the protestations of reform advocates on both the right and left.

There can be little doubt that the historical grip of antiblack racism is the single biggest factor in American punitive overreach. At the same time, even if all racism were magically leached out of the system, the racial disparity in punishment would likely remain large. This is due, in part, to the gap in offending rates that Butler forthrightly acknowledges, as well as the long-standing racial inequalities outside the justice system, from housing to the labor market.

In the growing movement to rectify the administration of American criminal justice, it is not always clear what racial equality should mean: a leveling down of black punishment or a leveling up of white punishment, or perhaps both, meeting in the middle? Lest the question seem absurd, bear in mind that in 1992, the Minnesota legislature decided to close the gap between sentences for possession of crack and powder cocaine—a disparity deemed illegally racist under state law—by jacking up the penalties for powder cocaine, not by softening the penalties for crack. The blanket application of unjustly harsh laws is justice of a kind, and equality of misery is one kind of equality. As Forman points out, a 2014 poll by the Sentencing Project shows that 73 percent of whites think the criminal-justice system doesn’t punish people harshly enough; at 64 percent, black opinion isn’t far behind. How many Americans would be at ease with a ferociously punitive society as long as the punishments were inflicted in a racially proportionate manner?

Chase Madar is the author of The Passion of [Chelsea] Manning: The Story Behind the Wikileaks Whistleblower (Verso, 2013) and recently taught a seminar on legal theory at Wallkill Correctional Facility through NYU’s Prison Education Program.