Wednesday, August 29, 2018

The Philosopher King


The Philosopher King

Tommie Shelby"The Point Magazine"
Tommie Shelby is the Caldwell Titcomb Professor of African and African American Studies and of Philosophy at Harvard University. He is the author of Dark Ghettos: Injustice, Dissent, and Reform (2016) and We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity.

His most recent project is To Shape a New World, a collection of essays on the political philosophy of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Edited by Shelby with Brandon Terry (who has written previously in our pages on #BlackLivesMatter and the legacy of the civil rights movement), and including contributions from Cornel West, Danielle Allen, Martha Nussbaum, Lionel McPherson, and others, the collection illuminates the principles behind King’s politics. Returning to the philosophical foundations and nuanced moral vision overshadowed by his monumental life, To Shape a New World reimagines King as a political thinker for our—and for all—time.

I interviewed Shelby about To Shape a New World and his essay “Prisons of the Forgotten: Ghettos and Economic Injustice,” over Skype in March 2018. The conversation has been edited for clarity.

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Julian Lucas: Your introductory essay suggests that when it comes to King, contemporary thought is held “captive by a picture.” Do you think that there can be a coexistence between King the political icon and King the serious philosophical thinker?

Tommie Shelby: Well, I suppose there’s not a lot we can do about his iconic status. But it’s possible to show a world-historical figure like him due respect without treating him like an infallible oracle. In philosophy as a field, we revere a small canon of figures. We also disagree with them, point out their limits, and take them down new avenues which might be more productive. One way of re-engaging King is to read him in the way we would thinkers like Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, John Dewey—as interested in fundamental moral principles, what aspects of society deserve our allegiance and which do not.

He’s also engaged in a public discussion. No great thinker is just sitting in their study coming up with everything on their own. Everybody builds on what came before, and King is no different. Scholars have rightly focused on Christian theology, but we thought it was important to situate him within broader philosophical and black intellectual traditions.

JL: You argue that there is a bias in professional philosophy against activist thinkers, and that the field has failed to sufficiently recognize King’s contributions. Yet the implicit argument of the book is that the tools of this field are nevertheless useful for arriving at a fuller appreciation of his thought.

TS: It’s rare for a non-academic of any race or gender, especially writing in the mid-twentieth century, to be considered with great care in philosophy. There is a bias within the discipline against treating someone politically engaged—whether as a statesman, politico, or grassroots activist—as a thinker.

We’ve had figures like that in the past, when philosophy didn’t exist as an academic discipline in many places. In the nineteenth century and earlier, a lot of the central people—Hume, Mill, Rousseau—were not professionals. Kant was one of the first.

But once you’re in the twentieth century, and in American universities especially, philosophy becomes an aspect of higher education. King had some aspirations toward an academic career before he pursued the ministry. Had the times been different, he might have been among us in that way. But academic philosophers are slow to accept outsiders as thinking with the depth and rigor that they expect from their peers. There are exceptions—even exceptions who are black, like Frantz Fanon—but it’s a hard bias to get over. Someone like King is up against a lot.

King is also not just an activist but a Christian activist, and not only a Christian but a minister. Contemporary philosophers don’t often speak about their religious background, and it can be difficult for people in such a secular discipline to see someone who takes to the pulpit as engaged in a similar intellectual pursuit.

There is also a general bias that you see even among activists, an impatience with foundational questions and the slow and painstaking thinking characteristic of philosophy. And people can’t always see a figure who is speaking in public and trying to motivate people, move people, especially someone with such rhetorical gifts, as a philosopher.

JL: What surprised you most about King’s philosophical commitments while compiling this collection?

TS: I hadn’t appreciated how important the idea of dignity is to his thought. It structures his critique of the limits placed on human liberty and opportunity by Jim Crow, and his objections to the impoverishment and ghettoization of northern black people. Maybe I also I hadn’t appreciated some of the more pragmatic features of his thought. It’s easy to see King as an idealist, but there’s a strong streak of realism in his work. He’s thinking very hard about what forms of political pressure one must bring to bear in order to realize the most fundamental ideals and principles. There’s a lot of focus on psychology, on diagnosing the mindset of allies and opponents. People often imagine that as a Christian minister he was aligned with moral suasion as the principal means of realizing his political ideals, and neglect the other forms of political maneuvering that are central to his thought.

JL: That struck me in Lionel McPherson’s essay and especially in Brandon Terry’s essay—that King’s commitment to nonviolence was not just optimism. He was considering the possibility of anti-black genocide in the United States, and believed that mass nonviolent disobedience was the strategy least likely to result in such a terrible consequence. The idea that nonviolence was anti-pragmatic, rather than a response to a realist appraisal of the world, seems like one of the elements of his thought that is most often misconstrued.

TS: I think that’s right. I also see him as arguing differently depending on the audience. Sometimes he is moved by moral considerations alone. His opposition to political violence was a moral commitment, a Christian commitment, and he would often say that it’s better to be the victim of violence rather than the perpetrator. But he also realized that others do believe in defensive harm—that it’s appropriate to use violence in self-defense or to advance one’s cause under extremely oppressive conditions. He tried to persuade others that even if they didn’t accept his moral commitments, violence would be self-defeating. Often, those arguments are quite, quite powerful.

JL: And often that engagement could lead to a deepening of his own positions. Brandon Terry argues in his essay that the challenge of Black Power and their objections to his strategy pushed King to embrace the coercive dimensions of nonviolence.

TS: Yes, that’s right. There are two parts there: Terry is emphasizing that for King it was important even in the political realm to provide a proper justification for his positions. He wouldn’t just say, “I’m leading this, so, do it my way,” but really try to persuade people. He had a strong democratic commitment to the justification of his actions, even to his opponents. That meant being willing to debate with them on their own terms, rather than by invoking values they don’t necessarily agree with.

There’s compelling people with the strength of the better argument, then there’s putting pressure on them by literally affecting their options, affecting what they can do. King was worried about certain kinds of boycotts for instance, so even as early as the Montgomery bus boycott, you might say “Isn’t this a kind of extortion? Isn’t he just saying, I’m going to use economic coercion to get what I want?” I think he felt like it was possible to see him as engaged in a morally problematic act by putting this kind of economic pressure on people—which you can do with other boycotts or rent strikes or wildcat strikes or what have you—and felt the need to explain why, while it is coercive, it’s not a morally impermissible form of coercion.

He’s not limiting himself to making a powerful moral argument and hoping that people will be persuaded. He can respond to someone like Stokely Carmichael, who insisted that King’s whole philosophy depended on the idea that white people have a conscience. Carmichael doesn’t think that white supremacists really have a conscience—you can’t really persuade them through moral reason alone. King’s response is to, for one, resist the dehumanizing move Carmichael made when he imagined that his opponents were no longer moved by a sense of justice. But he also concedes that moral suasion might be insufficient. Other actions might be necessary to get them to take your moral arguments seriously, in this case economically coercive actions that will make them see the seriousness of your commitment and reconsider their stubbornness.

JL: Right. And in advocating nonviolent coercion, he made use of—and in many cases subverted—the masculinist rhetoric more closely associated with Black Power.

TS: He uses martial language a lot, and some of that rhetoric is in the Bible. But using the language of army and war and struggle and fighting—speaking that language while rejecting physical violence allowed King to say to those who think this nonviolence, love, and hope business is not strong enough stuff given what we’re facing, “What shows more fortitude and courage and solidarity and self-respect than fighting to politically empower people in the violent, racist South? Doesn’t that exemplify these martial values better than standing in Harlem or Detroit, telling people who already agree with you how horrible the white man is?” By contrasting mere tough talk with the tremendous bravery and willingness to put things on the line in his campaigns, he could turn the masculinist rhetoric often associated with black power to his advantage.

JL: One thing I really took from this collection is that in the general repetition of isolated quotes from King, there’s a constant suggestion that his activism and his philosophy relied on a naïve or overly optimistic idea of human nature. So many of these essays manage to put King’s thought back in an intellectual and political context that shows that the strategies that he developed were actually founded in that, rather than in spite of the dire situation.

TS: He has a political sophistication that many professional political philosophers do not. Being engaged practically every day with local municipal, state and national government forces, being in dialogue with senators, sheriffs, attorney generals and the president—being in the thick of it rather than just in his study. He had a real appreciation for the nuances of strategic political struggle while never losing sight of his broader ideals, never never just seeing it as all a cynical game of maneuvering. He realized that maneuvering needs to be shaped and constrained by a commitment to principle. You almost never see this in politicians, an extreme effectiveness combined with unshakeable commitment to principle. He wasn’t constrained by running for office, of course, but it’s still a remarkable combination of high-minded thinking and tough, hard-nosed strategy.

JL: Many of the essays emphasize that King not only fought against discrimination as an evil but for civic participation as a good. Why has he become so indelibly associated with struggles against discrimination rather than the moral effort of, as your title suggests, shaping a new world?

TS: He gets associated with Great Society American liberalism, which he did have sympathy for, but if you fix him in that framework you might focus too much on non-discrimination. But even in fairly well-known texts like “Letter from Birmingham Jail,” you see a person with a robust conception of democracy as tied to a sense of collective self-governance on fair terms. That requires a citizenry empowered to shape the course of public life. You need more than just a formal right to vote, as important as that is. You need to be at the table, to discuss the direction of policy, to work in conjunction with others so that your actions have more power. If you consider King as a robust democratic thinker, you can see him as not just concerned with the protection of basic constitutional liberties—important as those are—but with building a truly democratic society, one where the citizenry is empowered to control their fate. That opens up possibilities for seeing him as a more radical thinker.

JL: And that empowerment relies, of course, not just on abstract rights but the economic means to make use of them. You make an interesting point about economic justice and full democratic participation in “Prisons of the Forgotten,” where you discuss King’s move to Chicago and his focus on the urban poor in the “second phase” of the civil rights movement. You claim that King was not just anti-poverty but egalitarian, in the sense that he believed persons who are poor can’t maintain their equal civic standing in the presence of extreme inequality and great wealth. That’s a more radical idea than the common image of King on economic justice gives us.

TS: You can get the impression that all he really cares about is making sure that there’s a proper safety net. He certainly is concerned with that, but egalitarian commitments also figure in his anti-poverty stance. Some of it has to do with what philosophers call “relational equality.” It’s not just that you’ve fallen below an absolute poverty level, it’s that when you’re sharing a society with others, you have to share not just in the burdens but the benefits of that common form of life. There’s no way to be an equal in this common project if some people have extraordinary wealth and spend lots of money on unnecessary leisure items when others are struggling to maintain shelter and a decent diet. There’s no way for you to see yourself as an equal when even your most basic material needs have less weight than others’ access to $4 million penthouse apartments in New York.

JL: It was interesting to read that King advocated for a guaranteed basic income, the decoupling of social worth from labor when full employment wasn’t possible. Now we’re in a moment where people from Mark Zuckerberg to Richard Branson have endorsed that policy, but it seems less driven by a commitment to egalitarianism than making sure that those who are marginalized don’t bring down the system. So, many of King’s egalitarian policies have been accepted by a growing consensus, yet we seem farther and farther away from his deeper commitment to economic justice as enabling civic equality.

TS: He noticed the impact of automation on labor, especially low-skilled or moderately skilled labor, early on. The Great Migration happened because a lot of these cities were industrializing. With a large manufacturing sector, people with limited educations and skills could find jobs to support their families in relative economic security. But as deindustrialization and globalization accelerate, people are left with precarious, insecure jobs without benefits. They end up largely in the service sector, where there tends to be a bias against men. So you end up with a lot of jobless men, and having a lot of young men with nothing to do is not great for any society.

JL: Unless you’re building an army of conquest.

TS: Exactly, it’s a recipe for disaster. What came out of this—which King didn’t live to see—was the growth of the penal system, mass incarceration, and an underground economy that draws a large number of people with no real work. Some might turn to alcohol and drugs, others might be overcome by depression, others will rebel and act out in frustration. There’s a question of what to do with them. King thought you couldn’t justify an economic structure to everybody within it if there’s not a dignified avenue for everybody to fulfill their basic material needs. If you can do that through employment, whether in the private or the public sector, that’s perfectly fine. But if you can’t, these people have a justice claim on a minimum set of resources to meet their material needs, and you need to meet that minimum set of material needs in order to enable their participation in public life as an equal.

JL: I think when you say dignified avenue, that’s key. I’m thinking of the Trump administration plan to replace food stamps with a set menu that poor people just have to accept. These questions of dignity and relational inequality are far from solved, and that’s where King’s thought—and your intervention into King’s thought—are important.

TS: I think he would have seen these conditional requirements on access to material necessities as an expression of public contempt for a segment of the citizenry. Especially when these conditions are imposed by a small affluent elite. He rejected the ideology that says your worth depends on your economic independence. When people don’t have dignified avenues to secure their basic needs, pushing an ideology of that sort just looks like a way for the affluent to maintain power and to capture the lion’s share of the economic spoils at the expense of their fellows. It stigmatizes them, and King would clearly see this as incompatible with mutual respect and inherent dignity. We express our esteem for the dignity of others by how we arrange our social affairs.

JL: And, as you write in Dark Ghettos, many people don’t put up with this contemptuous treatment. I’m interested in your argument that in many cases shoplifting, tax and welfare fraud, and refusal to work can be seen as legitimate forms of dissent, dramatizing systemic injustices that arise from this lack of access to material needs. Is there an analogy to be drawn between this “impure dissent”—as you call it—and civil disobedience?

TS: I’m certainly inspired by how King thinks about dissent, though I probably depart from it in some ways. His conception of political dissent can be seen as having two parts. One part emphasizes non-cooperation with evil. We’re permitted to withdraw our support as a way of disassociating ourselves from evil. We can refuse to comply with some social expectations—sometimes even the law itself—as a way of withdrawing our support from what we regard as unjust. But he would add that the way we withdraw should be connected to a positive form of political engagement concerned with altering things for the better.

I think that some instances of shoplifting, underground economic activity, and other forms of nonviolent law-breaking can be appropriately conceived as, at least in part, a form of symbolic political dissent. But that leaves open the question of whether doing that will also have a positive effect. It may or may not. Is it coordinated? Does this form of “impure dissent” publicly convey that it’s a condemnation of an unjust system, or does it seem opportunistic? You owe it to others to make plain that your refusal to submit is principled, rooted in a sense that things are unjust, rather than cynicism. It’s not just, “Oh, it’s gangsters all the way down, from the White House to the boulevard, so I’m gonna get mine.” So it’s important to avoid making it seem like that’s what you’re doing.

But there’s a second part where maybe I disagree with King. It seems permissible to dissent without making the case that it will make things better. Sure, it might alienate potential allies, or invite political repression, or burden, to some extent, others who are oppressed. But if you think of it by analogy to slavery, some people just refused to go along. They were defiant, and that would often bring repression from slaveholders upon those who were more obedient. Is that okay? Sometimes it is. I think it would be permissible to escape or resist slavery without actually making anything better. That’s permissible, even though I think that where possible, one should turn one’s dissent toward lifting the burdens of the oppressed. So, I agree with King—that’s ideally what you try to do. But even if you can’t, resistance can be a defensible way of affirming your own self-respect and escaping the burdens imposed by an unjust scheme.

JL: Do you think that what you’re calling impure dissent could ever have the principled effectiveness of King’s nonviolent civil disobedience?

TS: I like to think so. Quite often—and this is true of many black people, too—people see the dissent of ghetto denizens as pure hopelessness, despair, cathartic action arising from deep frustration. If one could effectively convey through these acts a principled opposition to injustice, it might show others that these are people who could potentially be allies in a collective struggle. From the other side, you need the people who might be inclined toward contempt for the more rebellious, alienated members of the ghetto poor to see their actions in a more positive light. It requires a little give and take from both.

JL: I was fascinated to read that at the end of his life, King was organizing gang members in Chicago and with the Poor People’s Campaign was planning to build, essentially, a shantytown in Washington, D.C. It seems like the beginning of an effort to apply that idea of theater in civil disobedience to these problems of urban poverty which might be more difficult to dramatize than discrimination.

TS: I think that’s right. King was a democrat in the small-d sense. He believed in the political efficacy of ordinary people, and didn’t think that their oppression made them unsuitable to engage in public action for the improvement of society. To see even the most alienated elements of the populace—gang members, the poor, sometimes even the homeless—as political actors who could be drawn into a collective struggle conveys a deep commitment to the democratic ethos. We are all capable of playing such a role, and we shouldn’t give up on people because they’re oppressed.

Sometimes he’d talk about “somebodiness,” a conviction that you have equal worth to others, that you don’t deserve to be treated as an inferior, and that you won’t put up with a society that does so. Insofar as people are able to maintain that sense of dignity, they are potential allies, people you can draw into collective struggle and treat as comrades. People who’ve lost their self-respect, who don’t have a sense that they have inherent, equal worth, will often submit. “Well, that’s just the way things are, right? Well, you know how white people are, right?” And King believed that was something that had to be combated. You need to convince people that you are their equal, and you should affirm that in various ways, including just not putting up with their nonsense. And when you look at the more alienated members of the ghetto poor, they are already expressing that. They’re not just going to go along. They’re not going to take your crappy job and go along with the law and respect the police who are just there to contain them. So they’re already conveying self-respect. That doesn’t have to be built. What has to be built is a sense of hope. That’s what they’re missing.

JL: In other words, he wasn’t there to “fix” everybody Treemonisha-style. He was meeting people where they were. Do you see that commitment to not giving up on the oppressed because they were oppressed as connected to not giving up on the oppressor?

TS: That’s the other side of it. He realizes that we’re human beings with lots of moral weaknesses. We’re tempted to do the wrong thing. We sometimes perversely take pleasure in our domination over other people, in their suffering, and this is as much a part of the human condition as sacrifice and being a good servant. The other side of seeing the oppressed as not hopelessly lost or incapable of playing an important role in our society’s future is also seeing members of the privileged as capable of change and of being moved by moral reason. That’s partly from his Christian background, seeing us all as vulnerable to temptation and vice but revering a God who gives us a chance to repent.

JL: You structure the collection through thematic sections—Traditions, Ideals, Justice and Conscience—and I wonder why you ended with Conscience, rather than Justice.

TS: King believed that we need to embody the ethos and spirit of the society we’re trying to bring about. At the end, you want to come back to the idea that this is a commitment of conscience. It involves a cultivation of political virtues that you know make you an appropriate ally, a trustworthy comrade. Not, you know, let’s just figure out what justice is and get there by any means, but the embodiment of that commitment to justice in everyday practice, in how you’re relating to your fellows all the time.

JL: Which is important whatever the outcome. So many of the essays remind us that King’s moral vision was rooted in an outlook that did not necessarily see victory as assured. As Paul Taylor writes in his essay on moral perfectionism, “The arc of the moral universe bends towards justice, unless it doesn’t.” The second possibility, too, was a part of King’s teaching. And Cornel West reminds us of King’s never-delivered last sermon, “Why America May Go to Hell,” where he wonders if all his teachings and methods were misguided. King’s high ideals are so often contrasted with the terrible setbacks his movement faced, as though the failures invalidated the vision. Yet it seems like they have an intimate connection. I know Brandon Terry is working on a book about the “tragic vision” of the civil rights movement.

TS: It’s easy to lose sight of King’s tragic sensibility, partly because he plays such an important role in keeping other people’s spirits up. He’s playing [that role] as a leader, and in a way he’s not allowed to publicly indulge in pessimism about the prospects of the movement. Seeing him struggle with these demons himself—that’s for his closest friends. And there’s also again the theological dimension, King’s sense of needing to turn to God for the strength to overcome that temptation to give up.

But we thought it was important not to obscure—and certainly Brandon Terry emphasizes this in his work—the realistic sense that you can lose. We can lose. Being honest about that can have positive effects. There’s always the threat of nihilist withdrawal or submission, but the possibility that victory is not assured also brings us back to the point you made earlier about why we end on issues of conscience. The arc of the moral universe will bend toward justice if we bend it. It’s not going to just come to us, it’s not going to just happen. It will happen when people of conscience commit to making it so.

JL: It seems like having a tragic sensibility—seeing that, in the short term, certain gains might be impossible—might encourage people to embody the end in the present, and to concern themselves with foundational values.

TS: Yes. If you see all of your political action as strategic and tactical or rhetorical, your activities become very sensitive to your sense of the likelihood of success. That can thwart your motivation, particularly in moments like we’re in now. But if your political outlook is rooted in a commitment to the improvement of self, to live in a dignified way that you can be proud of despite the fact that you might lose, that opens up the possibility for continuous action and continuous struggle, even in the face of great odds. It turns the question from a purely means-ends or cost-benefit calculation to a question of how to live, what the good life is for each of us individually and what kind of ambitions we should seek out so that we can be proud of the life that we lived.

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Thursday, August 09, 2018

Teen-Girl Sex and Skate

How ‘Skate Kitchen’ Vividly Captures Teen-Girl Sex and Skate Culture

Natalia Winkelman The Daily Beast 

Most filmmakers who try to depict female teenagedom may as well be from a different universe. For her film, Crystal Moselle let her subjects take the lead.

Hit up a skate park on Manhattan’s Lower East Side and, amid the skater bros and dudes smoking weed, you’ll find a tight-knit unit of talented teenage women. With unruly hair whipping their faces and socks pulled up under their Vans, the women belong to an inclusive group of young female skaters self-dubbed “Skate Kitchen.” The name’s a two-fingered salute to all the dickheads who have jeered at them to get off the quarter pipes and back in the kitchen.

These are the badass women cruising and kickflipping through Crystal Moselle’sSkate Kitchen, a narrative film adapted from the girls’ real lives. At its center is Camille (Rachelle Vinberg), a Long Island native and skillful skater who religiously follows the girl gang on Instagram. Breaking her mother’s rules, Camille begins trekking into the city to hang at the women’s stomping ground, skating and smoking and making online videos. She becomes fast friends with the crew, getting particularly close to Kurt (Nina Moran), a no-filter firecracker, and Janay (Ardelia Lovelace), whose comfortable house and kindly dad make for a great summer refuge.
Riding the Brooklyn G train in 2016, Moselle, who’d blown everyone’s mind the year before with her stranger-than-fiction debut documentary The Wolfpack, overheard a couple of teens recounting their past night’s escapades. Moselle couldn’t help but listen in. “Nina has this incredible voice. It just travels,” says Moselle, wearing giant crescent moon earrings and sipping on a green juice in Manhattan the week before the film’s release. “She can silence a room.”

But what really caught Moselle’s attention wasn’t what the girls (who turned out to be Vinberg and Moran) were saying, but what they were toting: skateboards. When they got off at the same stop, Moselle cornered the teens and introduced herself while trying to covertly record them on her phone. “They totally caught me,” Moselle recalls. “I actually still have the video.”




The chance encounter spurred a years-long collaboration, resulting in what would become Moselle’s first narrative feature. To pen the script, Moselle copied down stories from the women’s lives and shuffled them around on a big board. The Skate Kitchen consulted on every step, taking part in periodic improv workshops to ensure each scene felt organic and the dialogue true to their vernacular.

Similar to The Wolfpack—in which Moselle observes a gaggle of teenage brothers quarantined in a tenement apartment by protective parents—Skate Kitchen engages the sort of anti-scripted yet lightly stilted vibe of a fly-on-the-wall documentary. Dialogue is slangy and off the cuff. “That’s valid” is the movie’s most-recited phrase.

But reproducing skate parlance was only one part of Moselle’s mission. Devising realistic day-to-day conversations—ranging from tampons to crushes to hookups—was the bigger challenge. “There’s a real innocence to these girls and their scene. It’s not, like, drug-fueled. It’s very fun,” Moselle says. “I think Nina told me about how she’d made out with three girls in one night, and I was like, OK, that’s something we have to recreate.”

In one scene, lounging at Janay’s, Kurt interrogates Camille about her sexual preference. “Do you like dick or pussy?” she demands. “Boys… I like boys,” Camille offers. Unfazed, Kurt replies, “I like pussy. Good pussy.” Later on, Camille approaches a different friend about a guy she’s been seeing. “Do you like him?” she asks. “I like how he gives me head,” the friend replies, her mouth curled into a sly smile.
“I love to see New York in a new perspective. And to shut down the idea that New York is dead. I’m like, you don’t hang out with enough teenagers. These girls are finding a new version of New York every single day.”
— Crystal Moselle
Story-wise, Skate Kitchen hits familiar coming-of-age beats—the strict mother, the best friend secrets, the love triangle—but its casual verisimilitude elevates it to a league of its own. Of course, it doesn’t hurt that its characters are dynamic, hardcore female athletes, the type of women you don’t tend to see on the big screen.

With the movie’s buzz, Moselle has become the newest inductee into a nebulous girl gang of her own, an expanding (but still criminally scant) array of modern female directors approaching women’s stories with a refreshing sense of authenticity: Andrea Arnold, Dee Rees, Elizabeth Wood. Arnold’s 2016 teen road epic American Honey is a particularly frequent point of comparison for Moselle’s film due to the parallel hip-hop soundtracks, zippy handheld camera, and brave trust in first-time actors.

The only young professional cast member in Skate Kitchen is Jaden Smith, who plays Camille’s love interest Devon. Smith came to mind for the part while Moselle and the crew were brainstorming actors; it was important that whoever played him actually knew how to skateboard. Serendipitously, Smith had DM’ed Vinberg on Instagram months earlier, complimenting her videos and inviting her to skate in Los Angeles should she ever be in town. Like Shia LaBeouf in American Honey, Smith slips into the ensemble seamlessly, drawing undue attention only via his hair, dyed bright red.

Moselle also shares Arnold’s observant eye and sense of adventure. New York City has a long cinematic history, but in Skate Kitchen the familiar environs feel fresh and invigorating. The secret, Moselle says, was letting the girls take the lead. “I love to see New York in a new perspective,” she says. “And to shut down the idea that New York is dead. I’m like, you don’t hang out with enough teenagers. These girls are finding a new version of New York every single day.”


Magnolia Pictures


Director Crystal Moselle and star Rachelle Vinberg on the set of 'Skate Kitchen'
Teen girls have long been seen as notoriously mysterious creatures, and notoriously difficult to capture onscreen. But that’s only because the majority who have endeavored to do so are of a different gender and generation. To them, the Skate Kitchen may as well be from another universe. It’s no wonder viewers are also likening Skate Kitchen to Kids, the canonized exemplar of raw teenage realism written by a young Harmony Korine: Both films got a boost from someone on the inside.

“There’s so many stories about what people think women talk about,” says Moselle. “The people that are putting the films out into the world—they’re not women, they’re men. And I think it’s time for them to realize that people do want to see these films. That they want these stories to live.” 

She adds, “What’s cool is that I think a lot of these films are being financed right now, but as far as them actually getting out into the world, it’s a little bit more tough. So I think it’s just about pushing forward.”

Monday, August 06, 2018

What Are Capitalists Thinking?


What Are Capitalists Thinking?


If they’re worried about what’s driving the growing appeal of socialism, they need to look in the mirror.

By Michael Tomasky Special to New York Times



Contributing Opinion Writer
Soviet poster commemorating the October Revolution of 1917.Michael Nicholson/Corbis, via Getty Images


I’ve been fretting lately about the state of mind of America’s capitalists. All these socialists coming out of the woodwork must have them in quite a lather. So I write today with some friendly advice for the capitalist class about said socialists.


You want fewer socialists? Easy. Stop creating them.

Every once in a while in history, cause and effect smack us in the face. The conditions under which the czars forced Russians to live gave rise to Bolshevism. The terms imposed at Versailles fueled Hitler’s ascent. The failures of Keynesianism in the 1970s smoothed the path for supply-side economics.

And so it is here. As I noted recently in The Daily Beast, the kind of capitalism that has been practiced in this country over the last few decades has made socialism look far more appealing, especially to young people. Ask yourself: If you’re 28 like Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, the New York congressional candidate who describes herself as a democratic socialist, what have you seen during your sentient life?

You’ve seen the United States go from being a country that your parents — or if you’re 28, more likely your grandparents — described as a place where life got better for every succeeding generation to a place where for millions of people, quite possibly including you, that’s no longer true.


As that happened, you’ve seen the rich get richer, and you’ve perhaps noticed that the government’s main response to this has been to keep cutting their taxes (in fairness, President Barack Obama did raise the highest rate in 2013 to 39.6 percent from 35 percent, although for single filers, that rate didn’t kick in until earned income went above $400,000).

You witnessed the financial meltdown of 2008, caused by big banks betting against themselves. Capitalists might want to consider how all that looked to a young person who came from a working-class family and who probably knows someone who lost a job or even his house, while some of the bankers who helped create the mess walked away with golden parachutes, like that of Countrywide Financial’s Angelo Mozilo, which The Times valued at $88 million.

You’ve watched corporations hoard profits, buy back their stock and not reinvest in their workers the way they once did as they move jobs to Central America and Bangladesh. If you read a lot, you know that stock buybacks were permitted under the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Rule 10b-18, which dates to the Reagan era, and that since it’s just an S.E.C. rule, it can be changed without having to pass legislation, but no one in either of the Democratic administrations since then bothered.

I could go on like this for 20 paragraphs. Many more, in fact. But you get the idea. Back in the days when our economy just grew and grew, we had a government and a capitalist class that invested in our people and their future — in the Interstate highways, the community colleges, the scientific research, the generous federal grants for transportation and regional development.

And, funny thing, during all this time, socialism didn’t have much appeal. Back in the 1910s and ’20s, during an era of intense labor strife and before the existence of the welfare state, there were a couple of Socialist Party members in the House of Representatives — Victor Berger of Wisconsin and Meyer London of New York — as well as hundreds of Socialist mayors and state legislators and local officials. 


But during the “Trente Glorieuses,” to use the French term — the glorious 30 years from 1945 to 1975 when everything largely worked in Western economies — socialism’s appeal in America waned. In the 1910s and ’20s, the Socialist Party’s presidential candidates received hundreds of thousands of votes, or more. In 1956, the party’s presidential hopeful, Darlington Hoopes, won a mere 2,044 votes (other small leftist parties did somewhat better).

During this time and into the Reagan era, the broader American left — defined not by party but by belief — played a constructive role in supporting civil rights, opposing the Vietnam War and doing what it could to fight the new concentration of wealth. But, with the Cold War raging, its numbers were small and its influence negligible. 

So, back now to our 28-year-old. She was born in 1990. She will probably remember, in the late ’90s, her parents feeling pretty good about things — median household income did go up under Bill Clinton more than they had under any president in a long time, even more than under Ronald Reagan. But ever since, the median income picture has been much spottier, hardly increasing at all in inflation-adjusted dollars over 18 long years. And those incomes at the top have shot to the heavens.

So if you were a person of modest or even middle-class means, how would you feel about capitalism? The kind of capitalism this country has been practicing for all these years has failed most people. 

Yes, it’s given us lots of shiny objects to gush about. A smartphone that can display slow-motion video is a wonder. But an affordable college education, though perhaps not a wonder, is a necessity for a well-ordered society. So is a solution to a national drug crisis in which 115 people die every day, as well as a lot of other problems that the capitalism of our era has simply ignored.

I have mixed feelings about this socialism boomlet. It has yet to prove itself politically viable in general elections outside a handful of areas, and by 2021 we could wake up and see that it’s been a disaster for Democrats. 

But I understand completely why it’s happening. Given what’s been going on in this country, it couldn’t not have happened. And if you’re a capitalist, you’d better try to understand it, too — and do something to address the very legitimate grievances that propelled it.


Michael Tomasky is a columnist for The Daily Beast, editor of Democracy: A Journal of Ideas and a contributing opinion writer.

Wednesday, July 18, 2018

Dr. Death: Aspergers




Dr. Death

Long-deceased Viennese doctors, unless they’re called Freud, rarely make newspaper headlines. But one has recently done so on both sides of the Atlantic. On April 19, the academic open-access journal Molecular Autism published a detailed article by the Austrian medical historian Herwig Czech about Hans Asperger, the Viennese pediatrician whose name has since the 1980s designated a syndrome that forms part of the wider autism spectrum. Like many prominent Austrian medical figures of his generation, Asperger’s wartime record of involvement in some of the deadliest aspects of Nazi medical practice had long remained unquestioned or was glossed over. Now he stood exposed as having been far from an opponent of Nazi thinking; racial hygiene was, in fact, at the center of his beliefs.

The historian Edith Sheffer’s book Asperger’s Children was published a month after Czech’s exposé. Her research was contemporaneous with his and draws on the same archival sources, but books take longer. Hers is an impassioned indictment, one that glows with the heat of a prosecution motivated by an ethical imperative. She charges Asperger with a heinous medical crime: sending at least thirty-seven of his child patients to their deaths. Herta Schreiber, who had suffered meningitis and diphtheria, was just short of three when her de facto death certificate was signed, in part on the grounds that she was “an unbearable burden to the mother.”

Accused with Asperger is the whole of the Nazi ideological apparatus that converted a diagnosis—a highly personal form of human assessment—into the first rung of a routine killing machine. Finally, Sheffer wants to indict the entire capacious category of autism, which she argues includes too many different kinds of people alongside the high-functioning, often talented, but somewhat relationally challenged people who have been given the diagnosis of Asperger’s—a diagnosis that for the US has now been shifted, in the most recent Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), into the broader autism spectrum.

The term “autistic” originated with the talented Eugen Bleuler, director of the Burghölzli, the pioneering psychiatric hospital in Zurich. In the early part of the twentieth century some of Europe and America’s best physicians spent at least a season there. Bleuler valued Freud’s insights and took a cue from psychoanalysis in his efforts to attend to unconscious mental processes and listen to patients’ words. Among the staff was Carl Jung, whose patient Sabina Spielrein also became a well-known psychoanalytic practitioner and the teacher of the famous psychologist Jean Piaget. Patients were seen individually twice a day: doctors were instructed to write down everything they said, whether or not it sounded like nonsense.

In the detailed description of the group of schizophrenias he included in a 1911 book, Bleuler coined the term “autistic” to characterize thinking—something that, unlike many, he was certain was going on in his patients—and feeling that were more than usually introverted, self-absorbed, and lashed with fantasies. He said he owed the term to Freud’s “autoerotism,” which described an infant’s inner fantasy life prior to any engagement with the external world. Autistic thinking took place “in symbols, in analogies, in fragmentary concepts…in crude offenses against logic and propriety.”1 In Bleuler’s understanding, schizophrenic patients suffered from a breakdown in the relation between thoughts, feelings, and actions; from ambivalence (another new term, which Freud picked up from him), as well as from delusions and hallucinations. Freud folded the idea of autistic thinking into his own theory of the narcissistic state of earliest infancy, when inner and outer life were not distinguishable.

Autism as a separate diagnostic category did not exist for Bleuler, Freud, or indeed for any doctor until 1943. What brought it into being was the birth of a new field: child psychiatry, with its close observation of behavior and its measurements and assessments carried out in schools, hospitals, or institutions.

Bleuler’s patients were all adults. Children, if they were seen to be mentally ill or considered “deficient” in some way, were put in the care of hospital neurologists (as Freud had been, in his earliest medical position) or institutions. Then, throughout the 1920s, psychoanalytic thinkers like Melanie Klein and Anna Freud turned their attention to the inner life of the infant and child. Theories of child development soon arose, many of them based on the close observation of behavior. It was this latter emphasis on behavior rather than on inner life that tilted the balance toward the kinds of categories today’s DSM uses to classify mental disorders.

A stand-alone category of early infantile autism didn’t come into use until 1943, when the psychiatrist Leo Kanner published his “Autistic Disturbances of Affective Contact” in the journal Nervous Child. The article, heavily endebted to his Austrian colleagues Georg Frankl and Anni Weiss’s work in Vienna’s Curative Education Clinic, concentrated on eleven young patients, eight boys and three girls, who had been observed and assessed by a variety of diagnostic tests, plus parental reports. Kanner argued that despite the borrowing of Bleuler’s term, these children’s profiles were not precursors of adult schizophrenia. What they had in common was an “extreme aloneness.” They had no interest in others and had not established relationships with their parents or other children. They had, however, a good relationship to objects that didn’t change in appearance and position. Their speech was disturbed in various ways; they had an anxious and obsessive desire for sameness that manifested itself in repeated acts and speech. They also had excellent rote memory. Kanner’s children all had professionally successful parents, who he noted were not warmly affectionate toward their offspring: this led him to the rather unhappy later hypothesis that “refrigerator mothers” might have something to do with his small patients’ autism.

In Germany as well as Austria during the Nazi period, death, as Sheffer notes in her book, was often “a treatment option” for doctors. With the aim of purifying the state, Nazis designated not only Jews, Roma, and homosexuals as toxic subjects—the first two slated for elimination—but also the disabled, those of “inferior hereditary material,” patients in mental institutions, and children who were judged likely to become an ongoing drain on the public purse. Young people who didn’t or couldn’t conform, who were not gemeinschaftsfähig—able to demonstrate what Sheffer translates as “community competence”—regularly ended up in the so-called T4 euthanasia program, named after its headquarters, Tiergartenstrasse 4 in Berlin, home of the Charitable Foundation for Curative and Institutional Care.

In Vienna, whose population enthusiastically welcomed the Nazis, such children were sent to be murdered at the notorious Spiegelgrund, part of the Steinhof mental hospital complex in the Vienna Woods. Ironically, the Steinhof itself had been designed by the great architect of the Vienna Secession, Otto Wagner, in the reforming first decades of the century, when it had been seen as a pioneering project to improve the lives of the ill. “The child euthanasia program reveals an intimate dimension to extermination,” Sheffer writes:


Doctors personally examined the children they condemned. Nurses personally fed and changed the sheets of children they killed. They knew the children’s names, voices, faces, and personalities. Killings were typically done in the children’s own beds. Death came slowly, painfully, as children would be starved or given overdoses of barbiturates until they grew ill and died, usually of pneumonia. 

Sometimes their brains or other body parts found their way into research jars—a fact only disclosed in the late 1990s.

Asperger was part of the assessment apparatus that determined the fate of such children. Though no death warrants signed in his name exist, and though he claimed, like so many of his countrymen did after the war—despite prior vocal enthusiasm or fellow-traveling—never to have been a Nazi sympathizer, it is clear from the archival evidence Sheffer expertly amasses that he knew he was signing off on children’s fates. Crucially, too, his notions of what constituted “autistic psychopathy” in childhood, which he described most fully in his 1944 treatise of the same name, were deeply influenced by Nazi ideology.

Earlier researchers, like the science journalist Steve Silberman in Neurotribes: The Legacy of Autism and the Future of Neurodiversity (2015), have claimed that Asperger—who lauded his autists’ special, if eccentric, talents—was neither a Nazi sympathizer nor a participant in the euthanasia program. Silberman, like many in the field, may have been relying on the redoubtable German developmental psychologist Uta Frith, who spread Asperger’s fame from her base in the UK and remained willfully blind to his implication in Nazi ideas and practices. Perhaps the photographs of him have counted in his favor. They show a tall, fair man of impeccable bearing who would look good in the short trousers of the Wandervogel, the boy-scout-like groups he and the Nazis favored. Asperger did use some positive language about the more educable children in his care, but Sheffer’s analysis clearly tilts the balance against him.

Born near Vienna in 1906, Asperger trained at the city’s university during the 1920s. It was a time when an experimental children’s clinic, focusing on Heilpädagogik—which Sheffer translates not as “therapeutic” but as “curative” education—flourished under Erwin Lazar. Like many other doctors and psychologists across Europe and in the US after World War I, Lazar was interested in “dissocial” youths and in distinguishing between the social, physical, and psychiatric reasons for their difficulties or criminal behavior. Ideas of therapeutic education abounded. August Aichhorn, who was persuaded by Anna Freud to run a child guidance center for delinquents alongside the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, used these cases as the basis for his famous book Wayward Youth (1925). It was translated into many languages and reviewed in the UK by Donald Winnicott, the pioneering pediatrician and analyst.

Poverty, a desperate home life, and parental predations began to be seen as shaping these children’s psychological and mental lives and contributing to their delinquency. Yet once the social, the psychological, and the medical were conflated, it made a difference whether they were being assessed from the political left or the political right. For those in the latter group, a “wayward,” rebellious youth who didn’t fit into the normal cohort could land in a general category of undesirability—those “defective” individuals who were, according to right-wing politicians, a burden on the nation and, according to eugenicists, harmful to what we would now call the gene pool.

In Austria and Germany, as in the rest of the West since the nineteenth century, eugenic thinking was popular. In Britain—where it was launched in the 1880s by the statistician Francis Galton, Darwin’s half cousin, who was much influenced by his Origin of Species—the emphasis of such thinking lay largely on positive eugenics. Reformers both on the left and on the right supported intelligence testing and “breeding for the best,” in the hope that the general “standard” of the population would be raised. In Scandinavia, and particularly in Nazi Germany and Austria but also in the US, the emphasis was on negative eugenics. Forced sterilization programs for “undesirables” of all kinds persisted after World War II. North Carolina continued its enforced sterilization program of the “mentally defective or feeble-minded” until 1977. Five thousand of the 7,686 people sterilized there were black. Indeed, the wide acceptance of sterilization in various countries may be one reason that the Nuremberg Trials paid little attention to this heinous aspect of Nazi purification policy, which compounded sterilization with euthanasia.

Hans Asperger was a self-proclaimed eugenicist and a right-wing Catholic. He worked briefly with the staff of the progressive clinic that Erwin Lazar, a student of Bleuler’s, had led. It was in this clinic that many of the earliest ideas on autism originated, in particular with two of its talented staff who would soon emigrate to America. The Nazi sympathizer Franz Chvostek, who ran the so-called swastika clinic at the University of Vienna, became his ally, and he was abetted in his climb through the ranks when the Vienna Children’s Hospital was taken over by Franz Hamburger, an ally of Chvostek’s. Both men were known eugenicists and believed in mass sterilization. Hamburger fired most of the hospital’s Jewish staff, and in 1931 Asperger, aged twenty-five, became one of his early appointees.

In 1934 he was made head of the Curative Education Clinic, where he worked alongside the notorious Erwin Jekelius, an early SA member. With Hamburger, Asperger took part in the “Motorized Mother Advising” unit, traveling the Austrian countryside to provide medical advice to parents, but also creating a register of “hereditary feeblemindedness,” among other ills. After the Anschluss, Sheffer writes, Asperger’s other professional comrade, Jekelius, became “the most prominent figure in child and adult euthanasia in Vienna, directing the killing centers of Spiegelgrund and Steinhof.”

Asperger first mentioned “autistic psychopathy” in 1938, but it had already been described by two talented Jewish staff in the clinic earlier in the 1930s: Georg Frankl and his soon-to-be-wife, the psychologist Anni Weiss. In 1937 Frankl emigrated to the US with the help of Leo Kanner. At Johns Hopkins he worked with Kanner and eventually Weiss, who had emigrated in 1934 and spent a few years at Columbia. In Vienna they had together identified in high-functioning children “the disruption of affective contact” that became a classic part of the autistic spectrum. Asperger never credited his Jewish compatriots in his speeches or writings.

Sheffer probes Asperger’s affinities with Nazi psychiatry, particularly his use of the term for soulful belonging, Gemüt, at once an assessment of character and of unity with the Volk. A failure in Gemüt slipped into definitions of psychopathy: the term gemütlosen Psychopathen was applied to children who were withdrawn, willful, isolated, whose “confinement of the self…led to a narrowing of relations to their environment.” Not to conform or fit into the state’s stereotype of a healthy body and a healthy mind could mark one for elimination.

Children born out of wedlock, teenage loners, “delinquents,” unconventional adolescent girls whose stepfathers and stepmothers worried about their sexuality—all such undesirables could find themselves with a fatal diagnosis. Killings in Spiegelgrund began on August 25, 1940. By the end of the war, at least 789 children had perished under the euthanasia program; some had physical, some mental problems, and others simply didn’t conform to the time’s definition of “normal” and couldn’t, according to the doctors, be integrated into the community.

Sheffer dramatically incorporates the voices of the few children who survived the sadistic terrors of the psychiatric regime into her account, as well as extant case notes. This makes for an anguishing text. It also gives one pause. How did Uta Frith—who taught many of the neuropsychologists and cognitive psychologists who now lead the field and, in 1991, made the first English translation of Asperger’s text on autism—manage to overlook his Nazi affiliations? Sheffer tells us that Frith chose not to publish Asperger’s preface, which gives a clear indication of his Nazi sympathies. But then the city of Vienna, ever slow to acknowledge its record of active collaboration while pleading its “occupation” under Nazi rule, only memorialized the children who had been killed at Spiegelgrund in 2002. One of its chief euthanizing medics, Heinrich Gross, like Asperger himself, went on to have a successful postwar career.

Starting in the 1960s, the numbers of children with “autism syndrome” diagnoses rose and rose. Nonpsychoanalytic researchers gained prominence in the field and rejected Kanner’s theories about “refrigerator mothers.” Instead they favored measuring behavior to abet epidemiological research and the study of entire populations. What we now call evidence-based medicine, which focuses on statistics rather than individuals, was on its way. An epidemiological study in Britain by Victor Lotter in 1966 showed that autism was to be found in 4.5 of every 10,000 members of the child population. This number kept rising as institutions for the care of the mentally ill were closed throughout the 1960s and attempts were made by governments to integrate all children into the school system.Manfred Bockelmann/© 2018 Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York/VG Bild-Kunst, Bonn Johann K., who was killed under the Nazis at the Spiegelgrund children’s clinic, Vienna, 1943; drawing by Manfred Bockelmann, 2012

The figures also grew because the definition of autism syndrome now stretched to include children who had never acquired speech and might suffer from various kinds of “retardation.” With this reclassification, by 2006 the reported rate was 116.1 per 10,000. As the historian Bonnie Evans has noted, in France, where institutions for “retarded” children did not close, the numbers of people diagnosed with autism remained small.2

Meanwhile Britain and the US shared experts and evolving descriptive language for a range of behaviors and conditions that fell into the autism spectrum. In the third edition of the DSM, autism moved out of the diagnosis of adult schizophrenia to become a subcategory of “pervasive developmental disorders” (PDD). By the time DSM–IV was published in 1994, the criteria for a diagnosis of autism were “a qualitative impairment in social interaction” and “communication,” plus “restricted, repetitive and stereotyped patterns of behavior, interests and activities”—all setting in before the age of three. The diagnosis also included a delay or abnormal functioning of symbolic or imaginative play.

Asperger’s name first appeared in English-language medicine in 1981, when the British psychiatrist Lorna Wing published an account of a syndrome she named after him, drawing on his 1944 treatise on autistic psychopathy. In that paper, Asperger described children, some of them “little professors,” who lacked the ability to interact with others. “Asperger’s disorder,” a new subcategory of PDD included in DSM-IV, was distinguished by the fact that children showed no delay or deficit in intelligence or cognitive abilities or verbal communication, but like other autistic children exhibited impairments in social interaction and behaved in repetitive and ritualistic ways. Soon, Asperger’s became widely known as the high-functioning end of autism. In the popular media it was variously attributed to nearly all men and certainly all nerdy men: brilliant computer geeks, scientists, husbands who never adequately looked at or spoke with their wives.

It is unclear whether this common usage contributed to Asperger’s disorder disappearing as a separate diagnosis from DSM–V (2013) and being merged into an autism spectrum disorder. (Asperger’s remains in the International Classification of Diseases, which is maintained by the WHO.) We don’t know whether the autism spectrum will eventually emerge as a single neuro-developmental disorder with causes that scientists will track, whether the current pandemic is linked to environment or genes, or whether it’s a single disease at all (rather than a reclassification of various others).

What is clear is that by now the disparate cohort who bear the diagnosis of autism has grown hugely, and that for many such people their diagnoses have had a primary part in their self-definition. For some, this medical identity can urge them toward much-needed special care or special schooling. It can also have, as Sheffer indicates, a negative effect—perhaps like all group identities, which assume similarity where there is substantial difference. This book is dedicated to her son, Eric, who she indicates has suffered from the “act of classification.”

The philosopher of science Ian Hacking has wonderfully described the phenomenon of diagnostic categories “making up people.” A large set of social factors contribute to the popularity of a diagnosis, which in turn creates the lenses through which we see ourselves and others. The growth of the autism diagnosis has been set in motion by patient activism, statistical conflation, websites, blogs, and chat rooms, art exhibitions, provision of services specifically for that diagnosis, media portraits, Web and medico/political campaigns, books such as Andrew Solomon’s prize-winning Far From the Tree, and the attention of talented writer-doctors such as Oliver Sacks. All these combine to create a particular kind of being who, for better or worse, bears an identity that is a medical diagnosis, most often a psychiatric one that at once stigmatizes and destigmatizes. In Rewriting the Soul (1995), Hacking traced the noisy rise of Multiple Personality Disorder. That diagnosis has now all but disappeared.

Sheffer clearly wishes the diagnosis that bears Hans Asperger’s name would disappear, and indeed any “totalizing label based on varying traits” rather than a set of physiological causes. Autism imprisons children in a single classification and affects their being in the world and their treatment by others.

It may be that because of Sheffer’s work, as well as Czech’s, Asperger’s name will disappear from diagnostic classifications and fade from the popular consciousness. Whether that will suffice to dismantle the entire category of autism is doubtful. There are too many vested interests in the campaign for greater recognition, research funds, and services to sufferers. Campaigners, as well as many doctors and psychologists, are vocal in repeating that early diagnosis reduces parental anxiety and children’s loneliness, provides access to special schools, and helps children develop in the best possible way. Until another set of classifications arrives to deal with the considerable challenges that now go under this name, autism will likely be with us.

If I have one cavil with this impassioned book it is that Sheffer, in making her case against Asperger and Nazi mental health policy, perhaps too readily and speedily folds the enthusiastic and necessary reforms of the 1920s welfare state—with its far-reaching hopes of improvement for an impoverished class and hapless children—into the vicious Nazi state. Of the tireless medical reformer Erwin Lazar, she writes that while “seeking to improve the care of children,” he “expanded a system that in time would ultimately control and condemn ‘dissocial’ children.” It is true that a state that prioritizes society and the social good may end up creating an assessment apparatus with norms of behavior that sometimes lead to the ostracizing of those who are different and lack Gemeinschaftsfähigkeit or “community competence.” But this also happens in many states that prioritize individual rights and liberties and have no welfare apparatus whatever. As many countries after World War II have shown, welfare arrangements need not lead a state to do away with its own citizens.
  1. 1
    Eugen Bleuler, Dementia Praecox or the Group of Schizophrenias, translated by Joseph Zinkin (1911; International Universities Press, 1950), pp. 66–67. ↩
  2. 2
    “How Autism Became Autism: The Radical Transformation of a Central Concept of Child Development in Britain,” History of the Human Sciences, Vol. 26, No. 3 (July 2013). ↩